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Introduction 
Steve Gimbel 
 
               One of the most wonderful aspects of the 
job of university professor is that one’s occupation is 
based on an area of personal expertise that shapes 
one’s Being.  So it is with Richard C. “Dick” Richards, 
who, amongst other areas of specialization, is a 
philosopher of love.  Richard’s Being is one deeply 
entrenched in love.  There is, of course, the romantic 
love he long shared with his recently passed wife 
Marty, but there is also the love of many, many 
students and colleagues, both in and beyond the 
department at California State Polytechnic University 
at Pomona, and undeniably his love for poetry, 
humor, and the philosophy to which he dedicated so 
many years.  Most of all, though, is (as cliché as this 
sounds), his love of life.  Few people so embody the 
virtues they discuss, living so vitally and thereby 
affecting the lives of so many who come in contact 
with them, even briefly, that this love is shared by so 
many.  This volume is intended as a testament to 
that love given and now redirected back toward 
Richard C. Richards. 
                On the title page of my personal copy of his 
book A Philosopher Looks at the Sense of Humor, is a 
personal inscription in which he deems me his 
“favorite Jew.”  This is a sentiment I accept with the 
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deepest honor.  (I wish I could return it in the 
converse, but I would risk alienating my wife and 
while I love Richard…I don’t love him THAT much).  It 
is characteristic of his sense of humor: wry, sharp, 
and unexpectedly edgy while delivered with a calm 
sophistication.  If one were to encounter a martini as 
dry as his sense of humor, it would leave one 
shaken, if not stirred to action trying to find how one 
could mirror his subtle, effective delivery.  Richard 
contends that humor is the appreciation of 
incongruity and his humor perfectly embodies it.  He 
is capable of delivering even the most crude remark 
in a sufficiently erudite manner that you are left at 
first wondering whether he really just said what your 
ears heard.  Those who know him, know full well 
what he said, how he said it, and generally will need 
help getting off the floor as a result. 
                That scholarly, cultured way of being is not 
feigned for the sake of the joke.  Dick is the 
quintessential philosophy professor: possessing a 
mastery of the history of human thought, committed 
fully to rigor in discourse, open-minded in his 
consideration of perspectives well-beyond the 
expected, and playful with ideas both new and 
old.  He fully embodies the life of mind.  In this way, 
he stands as a model to those of us who later 
embarked upon the path.  He is the sort of authentic 
intellectual who reinforces your own love of ideas 
and wisdom because you can see without cynicism 
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that such authenticity is, in fact, possible.  He stands 
as an instance of the final cause of the passion for 
thought that led so many of us to start thinking 
about these questions in the first place as naïve, 
excited teenagers.  We then see someone well-
removed from those early days, who has traveled 
the road for decades and has retained the love of 
that journey. 
                Richard loves philosophy and we love 
philosophy.  For this reason, we also love him.  That 
love is the reason for the following essays. 
  
7 
 
Richard C. Richards, I Hardly Knew Ye 
Peter Francev 
 
I first met Richard Richards at California 
State Polytechnic University, Pomona, in the fall of 
1996. I was a Freshman who had a curious interest in 
philosophy; yet, at the time, I was a Biology major 
planning of a life in Hawaii where I’d be conducting 
research on sharks while teaching at the University 
of Hawaii and surfing before and after work. Little 
did I know that my life would be changed forever, 
after a chance meeting with Richard.  
During the first week of the fall quarter, I 
walked across campus from the biology labs and 
headed over to the Philosophy Department offices; I 
was planning on double-majoring and sought some 
much needed advice. Richard was the only professor 
in his office, so I nervously stopped and knocked on 
his door. He called out to “Come in.” I did, not know-
ing what to expect. There, sitting before me, was a 
rather lanky individual, whose face was buried in 
some papers.  
He quickly told me to sit down and asked 
what he could do for me, stating that I didn’t look 
familiar, asking which of his three classes I was in. I 
told him that I wasn’t a student of his- yet- but that I 
was a Bio major and was interested in double-
majoring. He told me that this was “Good. Good”, 
and that Philosophy would be a fine second major, 
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especially one where the analytical thinking skills 
would complement the scientific ones that I would 
surely be learning during the next four years. 
 He asked what my interests were in 
philosophy and before I could answer, he followed 
up with inquiring what philosophers I had read. 
“Nietzsche and Camus.” He quipped that Nietzsche 
was “alright” and Camus was a “good guy”. He said a 
few other things, mainly about which classes to take, 
including his own History of Philosophy sequence. 
(Richard taught both, History of Ancient Philosophy, 
History of Medieval Philosophy, Existentialism and 
Philosophy of Love and Sex. And as an eighteen year-
old, it was the last course that he mentioned that 
had piqued my interest.) I knew that my previous 
exposure to Nietzsche and Camus, which was merely 
“recreational” reading that I had done on my own, 
would require the course on Existentialism, and his 
two history courses were core required classes. 
Apparently, I was going to be seeing quite a bit of 
this Richards fellow—and he’d be seeing a lot of me.  
 
Philosophy 465: Philosophy of Love and Sex 
Right. So here I was sitting in Richards’s 
Love and Sex class, along with about 80 other stu-
dents, most of whom were wearing sweatshirts with 
the Greek letters of their fraternity or sorority sewn 
on the front. At exactly 6:00pm, on the first Tuesday 
of Spring Quarter 1997, Professor Richards walked 
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into our classroom (in one of the Engineering 
buildings, for some reason), put down his books, 
notes and syllabi down and announced the following 
disclaimer to the class: “Good evening, ladies and 
gentlemen. This is Philosophy 465: the Philosophy of 
Love and Sex. I am your professor, Professor 
Richards. This is not, let me repeat that: this is NOT a 
course in which we are going to discuss the pleasure 
of sex; we are not going to talk about why your 
boyfriend can’t get you to orgasm; we are not going 
to search for the “g-spot”, like Indiana Jones on 
some quest. We are going to look at all types of 
loves from a PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE. Period. If 
you’re interested in any of the aforementioned 
classes, please see Dr. So-and-so’s class on human 
sexuality or Professor What’s his name’s class on the 
psychology of relationships. Understand? Good.” At 
that point, exactly 1/3 of the class stood up, grabbed 
their things and walked out. He then turned to the 
remaining students and went over the syllabus 
BEFORE he took roll and dealt with the adds and 
drops.  
Hold on a second. What’s this? Look, look. It 
says “PORNOGRAPHY” for Week #7. YES!! I knew it. I 
knew that there was going to be some sort of porn in 
this class. And then he discussed the unit on pornos. 
We’d be watching a porno and discussing the merits 
of the porn with the writer, director and star of the 
flick. Wow. This was awesome; this really was a 
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senior level philosophy class. And then, six weeks 
later, at the end of week #6, Richards cued us in on 
what to expect for next week’s lecture and 
discussion: it was going to be…wait for it…wait for 
it…a foot fetish porno. What. The. Hell. Is that!?!? 
Well, dear reader, it is exactly what is appears to be: 
a porno of feet. Feet walking. Feet running. Feet 
jumping. Feet putting on shoes. Feet taking them off. 
Socks covering feet. Socks seductively coming off. 
Feet in red high heels. Feet in black pumps. Toes 
“playing” with grapes. Toes “playing” with 
earthworms. Feet, feet, everywhere and not the 
slightest hint of moaning or groaning.  
At the end of the class, I submitted a 
research paper where I argued the merits of Romeo 
and Juliet being in love and NOT in infatuation. 
Richards totally disagreed. He pitched his arguments 
during office hours; I pretended to listen and agree. 
However, this was MY paper and I was going to write 
it my way. And my way I did…and I received my low-
est grade in any of Richards’s classes. I earned a “B”.  
 
Philosophy 312 and 313: History of Ancient 
Philosophy and History of Medieval Philosophy 
 The following year, I was fortunate enough 
to take two more classes with Richard: Philosophy 
312 and 313: History of Ancient Philosophy and 
History of Medieval Philosophy, respectively. If I 
remember correctly, I had one class on Mondays and 
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Wednesdays and the other on Tuesdays and 
Thursdays, which meant that I had four days of 
Richard, his dry wit and the wealth of knowledge of 
nearly 2,000 years of western philosophy. I 
remember doing well in both classes; for History of 
Ancient Philosophy, my end of term research paper 
was a comparison of Plato and Aristotle on poetry. 
When I handed him a rough draft for his 
commentary, he merely quipped: “When it comes to 
poetry and pretty much anything else, Plato is a 
bastard.” From that moment onwards, I knew that 
one of my undergraduate advisors was an 
Aristotelean.  
 The History of Medieval Philosophy was a 
bit more subdued. We covered the major figures, 
using Frederick Copleston’s multivolume tome as the 
foundation of our reading. It was during the 
medieval class that I learned two important things 
from Richard: first, despite all of the godliness, the 
medievalists were an intellectually rich group of 
thinkers; and second, luckily, the Arabs thinkers kept 
Plato and Aristotle alive. He instilled in all of his 
students that if it wasn’t for the Arab philosophers, 
then the medieval period would really have been 
“the dark ages”.  
 
Philosophy 480: Existentialism 
Existentialism was my baguette and butter. 
Remember, back when I was a punk in high school, it 
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was Nietzsche’s aphorism “God is dead.” and Albert 
Camus’s novel The Stranger that ignited my interest 
in both Existentialism and philosophy as a whole, 
and now I was going to have my fourth class with 
Richard. It was my junior year. We began the quarter 
painstakingly looking at L. Nathan Oaklander’s 
Introduction to Existentialism. We briefly looked at 
Husserl as the Existentialists forefather, and spent 
the bulk of the class looking at Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, Sartre, Beauvior, and Camus. While most 
time was spent fairly evenly, I again learned two 
more crucial things from Richard that have stayed 
with me to this day: first, if Plato was a ‘bastard” by 
Richards’s account, then Heidegger went above and 
beyond Plato’s bastardness and was a “s.o.b.” 
Secondly, and most important of all, Camus is a 
fantastic philosopher. I learned the nuances of 
Camusian philosophy and this is Richard’s enduring 
legacy on me and my students. If it wasn’t for his 
methodical and meticulous analysis of Camus, then I 
would not have been motivated to attend graduate 
school at University College Dublin, where I would 
have written a Master’s thesis on Camus’s early 
philosophy of the Absurd. If it wasn’t for Richard and 
his appreciation and respect of Camus, then I would 
not have gone on to co-found the Albert Camus 
Society UK/US or the Journal of Camus Studies. And, 
if that wasn’t enough, it was because of insistence 
that Camus is a philosopher that I have been 
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fortunate enough to expose my students to the 
rigors of Camus’s philosophy.  
 
Philosophy 499: Independent Study: Albert Camus 
During my Senior year, as I was thinking of 
grad school applications, I was drawn to UCD’s 
strengths in Continental philosophy- not to mention 
the fact that it was a student-oriented program (I 
will explain this in detail, in a moment.)-  I approach-
ed Richard about working with me on an independ-
ent study, where I could focus on Camus exclusively. 
In hearing that I wanted to go to grad school in 
Ireland and write my MA thesis on Camus, Richard 
suggested that I look at Dostoevsky as an early 
influence. (This would be key because a year later, 
my MA thesis would have a chapter devoted to 
Dostoevsky’s influence on Camus. That chapter 
would stem from my research the previous year, in 
the final class that I had with my mentor.) I read 
Notes from Underground for the first time; I saw 
immediate connections to Camus’s characters 
Meursault and Clamence, from The Stranger and The 
Fall respectively. Even today, when I teach Notes, I 
still get goosebumps thinking back to my excitement 
at what I thought was discovery while sitting in 
Richard’s office.  
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Post-BA Graduation 
 Following my graduation, I enrolled at 
University College Dublin; one year later, I walked 
out with a MA in (Continental) Philosophy. I taught 
high school for a couple of years; turned down a PhD 
program in Philosophy (scared of being $125,000+ in 
debt by the time I finished and not having a tenure 
track job.); went back to graduate school (MA in 
English); and began a life of teaching at the 
community college level (Currently, with one year 
left before tenure and finishing a PhD in English.).  
I am a product of Richard’s dedication to his 
field and to his students. There isn’t  a day that 
doesn’t go by that I do not think of him, or what he 
taught me, or how he showed me to always believe 
in your students. He demonstrated to me that you 
push your students, even when you don’t think they 
can handle the pressure or the criticism, because 
often times they will surprise you. He was a model 
professor: he expected a lot from his students; he 
pushed them to their limits, but he was always by 
their sides encouraging them to never give up. He 
taught me to care and be respectful of our students, 
just as he was with me. It is his impact on my life 
that allows me to impact the lives of students whom 
I come into contact with every day. So, Richard, on 
behalf of the countless number of students that had 
the pleasure and honor to sit at your feet and learn 
from your wisdom, I thank you for everything. 
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Humor and the Good Life 
Laurie Shrage 
 
I don’t remember how it started, but 
somehow throughout my career at Cal Poly Pomona, 
Dick regularly asked me what colors I wanted. Then, 
a few days later, he would leave a bag of bearded iris 
rhizomes in our department office for me. Evidently, 
Dick was obsessed with breeding these plants, and 
his breeding program generated many “rejects,” 
which he shared with his friends and colleagues. My 
garden was full of his beautiful rejects, and I soon 
learned to appreciate these plants, which I think was 
Dick’s true aim.   
Before I arrived at Cal Poly, Dick launched a 
course on the Philosophy of Love and Sex. It was a 
popular course so, when I was hired, Dick asked if I 
would be interested in teaching some sections. I 
agreed, and over many years, Dick and I shared 
materials and ideas for this course. It’s hard to 
imagine that Dick’s course could be taught in today’s 
climate. For example, he would invite a filmmaker 
who made “crush fetish” films to his class to discuss 
the ethical issues involved. The films were often 
disturbing to students, and thus students would 
struggle both to understand the point of view of the 
filmmaker and then to marshal all the moral theories 
they had absorbed to argue against the activities 
depicted in the films. Dick’s classroom discussions 
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were lively, contentious, engaging, thought-
provoking, entertaining, and memorable. Dick was 
admirably respectful to both his guest and to his 
students, and worked to ensure that many points of 
view would be heard and assessed. He showed his 
students how to have illuminating and productive 
conversations among people with widely divergent 
views. Occasionally a student might complain about 
the topics or materials Dick shared, but fortunately 
our department and university could be relied upon 
to defend the principle of academic freedom.  
I similarly had a few student complaints 
when I included in my course (in the 1990s) such 
topics as same-sex marriage or BDSM. Today I am 
more cautious, as I have had students record 
without permission parts of my courses, and these 
recordings could easily be viewed out of context. 
Also, I am less confident today that universities will 
strongly defend a targeted faculty member’s 
academic freedom, or protect faculty who are 
responsibly teaching highly controversial topics. 
Dick’s greatest contribution to our 
department was his cultivation of humor. He often 
pointed out the incongruities of our lofty pursuits at 
Cal Poly Pomona surrounded by fields of horses and, 
of course, horse shit. Cal Poly’s campus was situated 
on an Arabian horse ranch donated by the Kellogg 
cereal family, and we also had an Ag school, with 
cows, chickens, and a swine unit. This was a great 
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place to appreciate the “paradoxical, the illogical, 
and in general the often surprising elements in 
human existence.”  For example, when teaching 
about the scientific study of masturbation in my 
Philosophy of Love and Sex course, it was heartening 
to discover that corn flakes were actually invented 
and manufactured by the physician John Kellogg to 
suppress this supposedly awful vice.  When Tony the 
Tiger mascots would show up at our various campus 
celebrations, these could be occasions to 
contemplate the hidden meaning and power of corn 
flakes. 
Dick was especially attuned to the odd 
similarities and contrasts between the self-
important, enterprising humans who inhabited the 
campus and the exploited, ruminating animals. His 
casual observations about the ranch/farm setting of 
our somewhat insane endeavor to lead the life of 
the mind served to sharpen our appreciation of 
incongruity. They also helped us reframe our 
obsessions—with annoying students or power-
grabbing administrators—and ultimately cope with 
the unrelenting demands of the work place. I 
vaguely remember him wishing we all had more 
horse sense about our predicaments. 
Although Dick began writing and publishing 
about humor after he retired from Cal Poly, I think 
some of his philosophical musings about humor 
wore off on me.  I began including a section in my 
18 
 
Philosophy of Love and Sex course on why sex is 
often the subject of humor—is there something 
inherently funny about sex? I would bring in 
examples of sexual humor, and ask students to 
analyze these in terms of the various theories of 
humor, e.g., superiority, relief, incongruity, play, and 
so on. It turned out to be one of the most fun and 
engaging sections of the course—and my students 
probably needed some relief from our investigations 
of sexual assault, harassment, perversion, and so on. 
In my course on feminist philosophy, I started 
including a section on gender and humor: what 
makes a joke sexist, why are there so few women 
comedians (there are many more today), what is 
feminist humor, and why are feminists charged with 
being humorless? It was hard to find writings by 
philosophers on these topics, and yet these 
questions invite philosophical analysis.  
I think Dick is right that appreciating humor 
is a form of aesthetic understanding. If this is so, 
then it would be good to expand our capacity for 
recognizing the incongruous and surprising elements 
around us. Perhaps, deepening such forms of 
appreciation should be included at all levels of 
instruction. When I read to my granddaughter, I’ve 
become more aware of how children’s books contain 
many incongruities and surprises, and part of the joy 
of reading to children is to see if they recognize 
which incongruities are “real” (in some sense) and 
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which are not. We expose children to fantasy and 
fiction in order, we think, to expand their 
imaginations and creativity, but perhaps part of 
what we’re doing is expanding their sense of humor. 
As Dick notes, this is different from the ability to 
laugh, and is more about the capacity to notice 
weird and unexpected relationships among things. 
Helping people develop their sense of humor is 
probably a good way to help them live a good life, so 
why don’t philosophers do more of this? 
Whenever I see a bearded iris, especially a 
dark purple one, I’m reminded of Dick. And then I my 
mind usually turns to crush films or why corn flakes 
are not just for breakfast… 
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Humor in the Zhouyi 
Bradford Hatcher 
 
Introduction 
It was the 1969-1970 school year at Cal 
Poly, Pomona, when I signed up to study some 
philosophy under Dick Richards, on the advice of my 
brother Byron. I was in the middle of a radical 
renovation of my worldview at the time, having 
dropped out of college. The rocket science major 
didn’t work out, once I realized that all the jobs were 
military, and the math major had suffered from an 
epiphany while trying to differentiate inverse 
hyperbolic trig functions on two hits of acid. I 
needed to switch to some more primitive human 
endeavors, where it wasn’t so very far to the 
creative frontier. Both philosophy and psychology fit 
that bill: those guys didn’t have a clue, except maybe 
Nietzsche and Maslow. I wouldn’t find out about the 
Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics until later. 
Neuroscience wasn’t really invented yet. 
Byron and I had lucked out big time in 
public high school with a world-class teacher 
(literally), who understood that education required 
little more than lighting a fire and keeping it stoked. 
Hunger to learn would never be a problem for either 
of us. And I knew that Byron wouldn’t point me to a 
lesser teacher. I would be serious about my new 
studies, but that problem was getting chipped away 
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slowly by Alan Watts and Asian studies. That’s where 
Dick came in, a funny guy in a serious business. I 
took logic and semantics the first semester, and 
ethics the next. There was something about humor, 
and the way Dick demonstrated it. I wish I’d kept 
copies of his zany-ass quizzes. Anyway, that 
approach of his gave me a huge missing piece to my 
puzzle. I had always had a fondness for pranks, and 
always enjoyed comedy, but this went a lot deeper 
than that. For me it was the license to unbind 
ourselves from any one perspective or frame of 
reference, to go exploring outside the box, to put 
unfamiliar things together, and to nest analogies. To 
poke the world, to sound out the idols for that 
hollow ring. It was the key I needed to cognitive 
nimbleness, and was almost the same thing as play. 
It was permission to be a polymath, an eclectic, and 
an interdisciplinarian. It was permission to question 
everything, and especially my own seriousness. I 
didn’t have that overview before, and I remain 
immensely grateful to Dick Richards for that gift. A 
2015 cartoon by Hilary B. Price pictures a happy rat 
walking atop the walls of a maze and wondering 
“Why didn’t I think of this earlier?” 
I picked the following essay because it 
illustrates what can happen when we approach a 
thing that’s always taken seriously with the suspicion 
that it might have something to entertain a sense of 
humor. The commentary is on the Zhouyi, or 
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Changes of Zhou, the original part of the Book of 
Changes, superficially a book of divination written 
28-30 centuries ago, but which appears to also 
contain a situational ethic or moral instruction for 
the young of the noble class (Junzi, a word that 
changed meaning with Confucius). The book was 
used officially by the king and the nobles. Of the tens 
of thousands of studies done on this book, from 
hundreds of different points of view, I have never 
encountered a one that acknowledged a layer of 
humor in the subtext. But I saw stuff that I thought 
was peeking through, even though humor had to 
have plausible deniability at the royal court, since it 
was primarily used to affirm important decisions in 
affairs of state. I saw what I thought were hints and 
puns, and plenty of irony and caricature, but I wasn’t 
certain until I had taken a few years to learn ancient 
Chinese and translate the book myself. 
 
Humor in the Zhouyi 
 In 1997, when I first proposed 
writing an article with this title, I wondered 
what ideas others had already happened 
upon and so I posted an inquiry on several 
newsgroups in search of some favorite 
examples. I was a little shocked to learn 
that, while many long-time readers had had 
several humorous coincidences and 
encounters with the Yijing, very few saw any 
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intentional humor buried in the text itself. A 
few, particularly those belonging to 
religiously Daoist, academic Modernist, and 
the Twitching Captives schools, were quite 
openly hostile to the idea. 
 Indeed, few systems of thought or 
belief have acknowledged humor as a 
special state of mind and made an honored 
place for it in their doctrines. Only three of 
the world’s ‘religions’ come to mind: 
Daoism, Zen and Sufism. All three of these 
seem to be deeply concerned with the 
resolution of paradox, of which spontaneous 
laughter, grinning, or weeping in good ways, 
is often the consequence. Elsewhere, humor 
seems to be more of a threat than a 
promise. When Abraham was called to test 
his faith in YHVH, he was asked to sacrifice 
his son Isaac as proof. Care to guess what 
the name Isaac meant when the story was 
written? Laughter. The coexistence of belief 
or conviction and humor is often the most 
difficult paradox of all to resolve. Just ask 
anyone who has followed their love of the 
lighthearted lore of Zen into a Zen 
monastery: this can be a bitter, cold shock, 
at least until you can get the Roshi alone. 
 Humor was making its way into 
Greek art and literature by the 5th century 
24 
 
BCE, and it was fully at home there by the 
time of Aristophanes. But humor had 
appeared long before this, on cave walls and 
in Egyptian hieroglyphics. It cannot be that 
people did no chuckling yet. As to the China 
of the Early Zhou, it may be argued that the 
serious matters faced by the royal court 
could not permit such foolishness, especially 
where there were questions of war and 
such. But doesn’t this call to mind the royal 
courts of old Europe, where the court jester 
or fool had the ability to make the king 
laugh at just the right moment? And how 
many lives might this have saved? There 
would of course have been serious 
constraints on the Zhouyi authors - it would 
not be at all wise to offend or insult the king 
or his court. The authors, even in jest, were 
not pure fools - wherever such seeds were 
to be planted, there would need to be a 
little ambiguity, a lot of subtlety, some back 
doors to escape through, and plenty of 
plausible deniability. Otherwise the work 
would face censorship whenever a king took 
offense. As such, it’s always very easy to see 
the serious side of even the funniest Zhouyi 
line. 
 I need to call upon my personal 
experience with the humor of shamans in 
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their more ‘primitive’ versions of the 
societal role of counselor or mental health 
worker. These people have cracked me up 
too often to ignore this. This proves nothing, 
but it prepares me to accept humor as a 
deliberately applied treatment, or a therapy. 
The Sufis have mastered this as well, and 
use it with a kind of surgical precision to 
treat human ignorance (of the divine) as a 
disease. The understanding of humor as 
medicine has even gained wide acceptance 
in professional circles, and claims of its 
effectiveness is backed up by a statistically 
significant number of statistical studies. 
Humor will usually involve being jerked 
suddenly out of a prior state of mind. In 
anxiety or neurosis, it is the ’thing which we 
do not understand’ which is obscured by our 
life within these mindsets, expectations or 
frames of reference as mental confines. In 
subjects for divination, the ‘thing that I am 
just not seeing’ will often demand nothing 
more than a new mindset, expectation, or 
frame of reference. This is humor’s home 
turf. ‘Before you say something that might 
offend another person, it is always a good 
idea to first walk a mile in their shoes. That 
way, if they take offense to what you say, 
you are already a mile away. Plus you have 
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their shoes.’ Much of humor, whether rude 
and crude, or refined and witty, seems to 
have two key ingredients: 1) a buildup of 
something that might be called an 
emotional charge, which is released 
suddenly into nowhere; and 2) the 
juxtaposition of two frames of reference 
which are worlds apart, with the humoree’s 
attention being jerked suddenly from one to 
the other. Sometimes, however, it may 
simply be the enjoyment of cognitive 
dissonance. 
The source of the emotional charge 
that humor makes use of is often something 
much less than noble: aggression, 
apprehension, fear, xenophobia, racism, 
sexism, revulsion at deformity, negative or 
anti-sympathy, or other emotional 
discomfort. The use of laughter, of course, 
goes way back in primitive society in its use 
as a corrective social force, as a precursor to 
shame. You don’t see much of this malice in 
the Yijing, but it may be that the frequency 
of malice in humor in general is the source 
of so much reluctance to perceive humor as 
a device used by the Zhouyi authors. In 
contrast, the emotional charge here, as it is 
in the teaching stories of Daoism, Zen and 
Sufism, seems to use more of the reader’s 
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hope, expectation and anticipation, and to 
rely heavily on the respect and reverence 
that the tradition is accorded. The current 
theories of humor, of which Arthur Koestler 
is the best known author, suggest that the 
process of humor involves emotion and 
intellect traveling a while down the same 
track or line of reasoning. The intellect is 
then made to jump suddenly and 
unexpectedly onto a different track, leaving 
emotion, with its greater inertia or slower 
response to change, derailed with nowhere 
to go and nothing to do but go Blooey. 
The frames of reference, lines of 
reasoning, or tracks to jump, can come from 
any two worlds which are unrelated and 
have their own sets of internal logic, 
assumptions, and rules. The two can be 
literary vs literal (walk a mile in their shoes), 
one meaning vs another meaning (take my 
wife, please), general vs specific (that was 
no lady, that was my wife), mental vs 
physical, specialized vs common, sacred vs 
secular, trivial vs exalted, conscious vs 
automatic, part vs whole, mental vs 
material, and so on. The simplest form, the 
pun, plays on the homonym or polysemy, 
the assignment of two different meanings to 
the same word or sound. The Yi seems to 
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have much of this - the limited number of 
syllables and polysemous nature of the 
Ancient Chinese language would, I suspect, 
make this play irresistible. Much of this, of 
course, would be lost to us, lost on us, and 
even lost on the later Chinese scholars. 
Some we can infer, like plays on Yi as 
Change, Easy and an ancient place name. 
And some seem to carry well between 
Chinese and English because they are the 
same puns in both languages and both 
cultures. 
The notion of cultural differences 
brings up a much bigger problem. As 
Koestler says, "Humor thrives only in its 
native climate, embedded in its native logic; 
when one does not know what to expect, 
one cannot be cheated of one’s 
expectations." In other words, if one of the 
two juxtaposed frames of reference is 
missing (or hard to reach, or poorly 
understood) in the cultural repertoire of the 
hearer, both sides of the joke are lost. You 
could see how the mere existence of 
cultural differences could be used to avoid 
looking for humor altogether. Even the 
Chinese people do not exactly live in the 
Zhouyi’s native climate. But look at this 
statement closer: only in its native climate. 
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This is oversimplified and there is  a much 
broader spectrum here. In its narrowest 
sense this points to the difficulty of a native 
of rural Minnesota in "getting" a New 
Yorker’s urban humor. A little broader might 
be the difficulty that an American television 
viewer has in laughing at a BBC comedy 
special. Then there is my own most 
embarrassing difficulty with understanding 
sophisticated puns in Swahili. But there is 
also a sense in which ‘native climate’ can 
refer to the broader realms of human 
experience, and I have already made my 
prejudices known regarding this issue - that 
technology and complex cultural advances 
aside, we still have a great deal in common 
with the Early Zhou Chinese as humming 
beings living in humming societies with 
more than a hundred millennia as a single 
species in common. And in conjunction with 
this, an argument can be made that the 
Zhouyi authors were keeping their famously 
keen cognitive abilities alert to the existence 
of human universals. Assuming that they 
were looking for common problems, this is 
what they wanted to write about. With this 
possibility, we should not be too quick to 
assume that any or all Zhouyi humor would 
necessarily be lost to our cultural 
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differences. 
It has been my admittedly 
unreachable objective to discover the 
intended meanings of the Zhouyi authors. I 
have made no apologies or excuses for this, 
and I will openly disagree with anyone who 
claims that this should not even be 
attempted simply because it is doomed to 
failure. As a working hypothesis, and not a 
theory in need of a proof, the value of the 
idea can be judged by its conclusions as well 
as by its premises. And one of these 
conclusions is that the hypothesis might be 
able to solve several long-standing and 
otherwise intractable problems of 
interpretation. An inability to even look for 
humor may have left a number of lines 
completely misunderstood and thus badly 
translated for all these many centuries. I am, 
of course, too close to the task to be the 
judge of this, and so I submit the following 
for your edification and amusement. 
Below are several examples of 
what I consider to be intended humor, but 
somewhat buried by the Zhouyi authors in 
what I’ve termed ‘layers of vertical 
ambiguity.’ It has gradually become my 
opinion that humorous devices such as 
these, particularly irony, used to illustrate a 
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situational ethics, and caricature or parody, 
using images depicting people ‘unclear on 
the concept,’ may be characteristic of as 
much as a tenth of the Zhouyi text. Irony 
and parody are the two most common 
forms, but there are others, some specific to 
the nature of the Zhouyi itself, which will be 
discussed as they come up. All this is in 
addition to the use of a still more frequent 
‘simple light-heartedness.’ Even if some of 
these nominations fall to more serious 
scrutiny, I hope that enough survive to at 
least open a discussion on the topic, to 
which there seems to be a lot of resistance 
from both believer and scholarly types. Two 
translations are given for each line, one of 
the popular versions and my own. 
Admittedly mine seems to put a little spin 
on the line translation to help to bring out 
the subtle ideas, but a look at the Matrix 
translation and the Glossary will show that I 
have still not ventured very far at all from a 
strictly literal translation. In fact, I have 
tended to be more verbatim than the often 
stuffier translations. 
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01.4 - 或 或 或 或 ，或 或 。 
 
* Leaping about on the brink of a chasm. He 
is not at fault. (tr. Blofeld) 
* Somehow to dance across the deep. With 
no mistakes. 
This one is more of an example of 
simple lightheartedness than humor, and it 
has a good reason for being so. It is 
generally assumed that the subject is still 
the young dragon, finally ready to make that 
all-important rite of passage, the big 
transition from aerodynamic theory to true 
flight, wherein the insubstantial wind must 
be grabbed, used for support, and climbed 
upon. (Wind is from the hui gua or upper 
Trigram in the zhi gua or resultant 
hexagram). Well, you may be a young 
dragon, but standing there on the edge of 
that cliff for the first time, your mighty 
knuckles are still really white. Just take hold 
of the wind - yeah, right. While the very 
Gravity of the situation must be fully 
appreciated, it is also the thing that will kill 
you. And so it is important to learn to 
‘lighten up,’ giving up all but the most 
necessary baggage. Lightening up could be 
just the key, just the thing to do against 
gravity. I think the line is similar in 
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implication to this quote from David Lloyd 
George: “Don’t be afraid to take a big step if 
one is indicated. One cannot cross a chasm 
in two small jumps.” Btw, this is translating 
Yue4, with its feather radical, as a shamanic 
feather dance, a rite of passage from one 
world to another. But here is an example 
where vertical ambiguity is necessary. At the 
same time, another querent might be ready 
to hear exactly the opposite: “Look down. 
This is a serious jump. Rethink this whole 
thing. Life or death. Nothing funny here.” 
The authors, at least from my perspective, 
appear light-hearted and playful much of 
the time. They loved to look at things and 
problems in novel ways, and they loved to 
have fun with words and expressions. But I 
want to concentrate here on lines which 
bear more of the structural properties of 
humor. 
 
05.6 - 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 或 或 或 或 ，或 或
或 或 。 
 
* The topmost line, divided, shows its 
subject entered into the cavern. But there 
are three guests coming, without being 
urged, to his help. If he receive them 
34 
 
respectfully, there will be good fortune in 
the end. (tr. Legge) 
* Entering into a pit. With no invitations 
extended to visitors, three people arrive. To 
attend to them will end in good fortune. 
The authors use the term Xue2 (pit, 
hole, cave) in several places the same way 
we do, as (also) a predicament, or an 
emotional state, or the dumps of despair, 
and as a pun. The general idea of the Gua is 
to maximize the meantime, to get ready for 
less humdrum experience to arrive, and to 
get worthy of its arrival. The opportunity to 
have cleaned up one’s pit, one’s dump, has 
now passed and now here come the guests. 
One can still salvage some dignity here by 
showing respect. 
 
10.6 - 或 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 。 
 
* The sixth line, undivided, tells us to look at 
the whole course that is trodden, and 
examine the presage which that gives. If it 
be complete and without failure, there will 
be great good fortune. (tr. Legge) 
* Studying the footsteps, examining the 
omens. (If) these come full circle, supreme 
good fortune. 
You have just finished treading on 
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the tiger’s tail. If you are still alive, this can 
be taken as the primary measure of success. 
Ghosts do not leave footprints. If your 
footprints do not lead all the way back to 
where you now stand, you must have had 
bad luck somewhere. The omen is that you 
have already succeeded. The natives of Fiji 
have a tongue-in-cheek peasant omen 
parallel: if you are walking through a 
coconut grove and a coconut lands on your 
head, this is an omen that you had very bad 
luck. 
 
13.5 - 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 或 或 。或 或 或 或
或 。 
 
* Men bound in fellowship first weep and 
lament, but afterwards they laugh. After 
great struggles they succeed in meeting. b) 
That is, they are victorious. (tr. Wilhelm) 
* Fellowship with others begins with wailing 
(and) weeping. But then follows with 
laughter. Mighty armies can entertain each 
other. 13.5x Praising each others abilities. 
I hope the translation explained 
this one. There are other levels to meet on, 
and the battlefields have better uses. The 
wordplay relies on the broad range of 
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meanings for Yu4 (7625), meet with, 
encounter, receive, entertain, engage, etc. 
to show that there are other options in real 
life as well. Here is a fairly rare instance 
where the Wing authors of the Xiao Xiang 
‘got it’ as well. 
 
15.1 - 或 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 ，或 。 
 
* The first line, divided, shows us the 
superior man who adds humility to humility. 
Even the great stream may be crossed with 
this, and there will be good fortune. (tr. 
Legge) 
* Authentic modesty in the noble young one 
(is) useful (in) crossing great streams. 
Promising. 
 
This line illustrates the simple, 
straightforward application of incongruity, a 
device used many times in the Zhouyi. The 
Gua Ming of Qian1, at least when it is 
glossed as Modesty, is fraught with a 
number of connotations which are 
inconsistent with the ideas being set forth 
here. Modesty can carry implications of 
false humility and self-effacement, or 
connote a toady or a sycophant. The Zhouyi 
uses this device to dismantle these illusions. 
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The very idea that modesty can be applied 
to the achievement of great and ambitious 
ends (and later, that modesty can even be 
used to set an army in motion) sets up a 
kind of tension which is broken only with 
the understanding that something closer to 
Honesty, Authenticity, or Maturity is being 
portrayed here. 
 
27.6 - 或 或 ，或 或 ，或 或 或 或 。 
 
* The source of nourishment. Awareness of 
danger brings good fortune. It furthers one 
to cross the great water. (tr. Wilhelm) 
* (At) the source of the appetites. Brutal 
(but) promising. Worthwhile to cross the 
great stream. 
For me this one calls up the image 
of two missionaries sitting in a big old 
cannibal cook pot. But in any event, this far 
across the great water, the tables can turn 
and predator can quickly become prey. The 
food chain is actually a nutrient cycle. The 
corresponding line in the zhi gua is the one 
beyond hope of returning, which was 
repeated in the West as Napoleon’s winter 
march on Moscow. 
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28.1 - 或 或 或 或 ，或 或 。 
 
* The first line, divided, shows one placing 
mats of the white mao grass under things 
set on the ground. There will be no error. (tr. 
Legge) 
* (For) cushions, using white thatch grass. 
Make no mistakes. 
This is an example of irony. While 
precaution is called for here, and this 
behavior shows what is ordinarily admired 
as a civilized, aesthetic sense, what is 
needed here and now is a heads-up brand 
of caution. Elsewhere throughout the Gua 
texts, the roof is about to come down. 
These little woven white place mats are 
seriously misplaced. The Zhouyi will 
frequently trap someone who has moved on 
to the Yao Ci texts but has already lost sight 
of the theme of the Gua as a whole. 
 
43.5 - 或 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 。[或 或 或 或 ] 
 
* In dealing with weeds, firm resolution is 
necessary. Walking in the middle remains 
free of blame. b) The middle is not yet in the 
light. (tr. Wilhelm) 
* Wild greens (on) dry land. Determined to 
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uproot. To balance the behavior is not a 
mistake. 43.5x The center has not yet been 
honored. 
This is irony again. Our dedicated 
gardener has too much force and not 
enough sense. Not only is he destroying 
salad greens as weeds, they are growing 
voluntarily on a hill, where no plowing or 
irrigation is necessary. Presumably he will 
then replace them with something more 
delicate, which needs more weeding, and 
will require that water be run uphill to meet 
its needs. This is not the world’s first 
permaculturist here, and not the path of 
least resistance. The character is 
demonstrating the normally praiseworthy 
virtue of persistence, but without this being 
in balance (Zhong1), it is not a virtue yet. 
 
44.3 - 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 ，或 ，或 或 或 。
[或 或 或 或 ] 
 
* His haunches have been flayed and he 
walks totteringly – trouble, but no great 
error! 44.3x His walking totteringly implies 
being able to walk without being dragged. 
(tr. Blofeld) 
* A rump with no skin. His progress (is) 
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second-rate now. Brutal. (But) not a 
complete mistake. 44.3x Advancing (but) 
now not being dragged. 
The Gua text was right: the woman 
was powerful. It was not at all useful to 
court that woman. Apparently, little helmet-
head has been demonstrating poor 
leadership skills for some time now. This 
represents one of the forms of humor 
specific to the Yi, preying upon the reader 
who has lost sight of the theme of the 
Hexagram as a whole, in this case Restraint. 
However, ropes, chains and other kinds of 
restraints may indeed have been involved. 
But he has learned his lesson, and now he is 
no longer bound, leashed, or tethered. 
Maybe some sweet nurse ...  
 
47.5 - 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 ，或 或
或 或 。[或 或 或 ] 
 
* His nose and feet are cut off. Oppression 
at the hands of the man with the purple 
knee bands. Joy comes softly. It furthers one 
to make offerings and libations. b) Thus one 
attains good fortune. (tr. Wilhelm) 
* Nose cut off, feet cut off. Oppressed by 
rouge-sashed (ministers). And then 
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gradually finding relief. Worthwhile (and) 
productive to sacrifice (this) sacrifice. 47.5x 
To suffer happiness. 
Our subject here is a noble or a 
sovereign (line 5) with the ability to make 
command decisions. But his life is being 
moved by forces outside his control because 
he is being so purely passive in all things. He 
has adopted the victim mentality. Maybe 
next time they bathe him they could use ice 
water. This is an example of parody, satire or 
caricature, and this device may be found in 
every line of this particular Hexagram. The 
Hexagram itself has being stuck in rut, a 
mindset, an expectation, or a frame of 
reference, as a good portion of its central 
theme. Given this, it is not surprising that 
the text attempts to get the reader outside 
looking in, and poking some fun at the 
victim’s approach to life. 
 
50.3 - 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 ，或 或
或 或 ，或 或 。 
 
* The third line, undivided, shows the 
caldron with the places of its ears changed. 
The progress of its subject is thus stopped. 
The fat flesh of the pheasant which is in the 
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caldron will not be eaten. But the (genial) 
rain will come, and the grounds for 
repentance will disappear. There will be 
good fortune in the end. (tr. Legge) 
* The cauldron’s ears [handles] (have been) 
altered, its function (is) impaired. The 
pheasant’s rich meat is not eaten. A sudden 
rain (would) diminish regrets. In the end, an 
opportunity. 
This is parody, satire or caricature 
again. This situation has been grossly 
mishandled, and you can’t get a grip. Here 
too is an example of common ideas crossing 
cultural boundaries and used as images, 
metaphors, and finally puns, in both 
cultures. If the cauldron represents, let us 
say, your philosophy of life, it lacks practical 
application. The cauldron appears to have 
been redesigned either by artists or by art 
critics. The most you can do now is pray for 
rain to put out the fire, to salvage what’s left 
of the fat, juicy pheasant. And rethink the 
relationship between form and function. 
The Gua theme concerns pragmatism, the 
application of reliable methods in the 
cultivation of merit and a superior culture. 
Empty ritual and show do violence to this 
objective. 
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53.4 - 或 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 ，或 或 。 
 
* The wild goose gradually draws near the 
tree. Perhaps it will find a flat branch. No 
blame. Wilhelm says: “A tree is not a 
suitable place for a wild goose. But if it is 
clever, it will find a flat branch on which it 
can get a footing.” p. 207. (tr. Wilhelm) 
* The wild goose advances by degrees to the 
trees. Perchance to find that flat branch. No 
harm done. 
A similar image appears in the 
Shijing at 1.10.8, with geese fighting for 
balance in a Jujube tree, so this image was 
apparently known to the culture as a whole 
and may have been proverbial. Geese, of 
course, have floppy webbed feet, not mighty 
talons able grab hold of anything but mud 
and water. The call here is for acceptance, 
patience, and adaptability, but the image is 
a caricature, or a Gary Larson cartoon. The 
goose, if he fails, can always waddle around 
on the hill, with a view almost as good as an 
eagle’s. 
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57.6 - 或 或 或 或 ，或 或 或 或 ，或 或 。 
 
* Crawling below the bed. He loses what is 
required for his traveling expenses. 
Persistence brings misfortune. (Blofeld) [In 
line two, a rabble of diviners and wizards are 
used] 
* Subtleties happening under the bed. 
Losing some valuables (and) an axe. 
Constancy has (its) pitfalls. 
This happened only recently, down 
in Line 2. Our subject has now been 
comforted, and laid all doubts to rest. His 
Wushi have assured him that this was only a 
couple of spooks trying to wear him down. 
But this time the ‘spooks’ are really there, 
and run off with his money and his axe. The 
symptoms are the same, but the disorder is 
entirely different: different kind of spirits 
this time, spiriting his stuff away. As Xun4 
doubled, this is the ‘thinking twice’ 
Hexagram. Here of all places it is not wise to 
generalize from single instances and go back 
to sleep on your bed of complacency. Quick 
generalizations are most ill-suited to the 
shapeshifting world of the Gua Xun. Here 
again is a line of the type which plays with 
the tendency to lose sight of the subject 
matter of the Gua as a whole, or to not 
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relate one line to what is happening in the 
others. 
 
Excerpted from The Book of Changes: Yijing, 
Word by Word, 2006, published free online 
at www.hermetica.info 
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Mongo Give Good E-Mail 
Camille Atkinson 
 
The first time I met Richard C. Richards 
(whom I later learned was also known as Mongo) we 
were at the 2013 LPS conference on the west coast 
of Florida. He was wearing a T-shirt that said 
something about having attended his own funeral, 
so I figured that he, like me, had a penchant for 
gallows humor. Later, during an author-meets-critics 
session focusing on his at-the-time-new book (A 
Philosopher Looks at The Sense of Humor), I was as 
eager to learn more about his work as I was 
delighted by the friendly banter between him and 
the other attendees. Although this was the first time 
I had been to this conference or met members of the 
society, it was immediately clear that this was a man 
who was both loved and respected. So, because I 
was determined to get a piece of him myself, I 
bought his book, read it, then reached out to him via 
email. Thus began one of my most cherished online 
relationships. Actually, that’s an easy hurdle to clear 
as I don’t, as a rule, have online relationships and 
consider the term itself a bit oxymoronic. No, we 
didn’t become “FaceSpace” friends or start “sexting” 
one another—in fact, I suspect that he would be as 
uninterested as I am in such 21st century 
distractions. Of course, I can only speak for myself, 
but I hope it will suffice to say that I avoid social 
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media as much as I do angry fire ants or artisanal 
pizza, and not necessarily in that order.  
Because I enjoyed him and our exchanges 
so much, I kept finding excuses to keep the 
conversation going. I also wanted to pay tribute to 
his work somehow—or, at least, the one book of his 
that I’d thoroughly read and carefully annotated—
because I found it fun, funny, and important. So, 
with his permission, I wrote an online review. What 
follows are some excerpts from longer dialogues 
using our pseudonyms—“Mongo” and “Daughter of 
One-Lung-Low” or, for brevity’s sake, “DOOLL.” I’m 
not sure how he became Mongo but suspect it had 
something to do with the Mel Brooks film, “Blazing 
Saddles.” As for my moniker, Mongo gets credit for 
coining it after I’d shared the silly, self-deprecating 
joke my Chinese-Russian father told his doctor when 
informed that he and his lungs were working at less 
than 75% capacity—specifically, he asked her to 
refer to him by his “Chinese name of One-Lung-
Low.” 
I hope this provides enough context to 
appreciate the following exchange and, no, I haven’t 
bothered to clean-up any grammar, spelling, 
punctuation, and so forth. Moreover, it most 
certainly will not be in APA, MLA, CIA, LSD, or any 
other proper academic style and format. 
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Me: Hi "Mongo"! 
 
Mongo: Hi, Daughter of One Lung Low.   
 
I’ll cut into your email and make some comments at 
the end if I haven’t covered it all. 
 
First off, your review of the book is a delight.  You 
have indeed captured my thinking, emphasizing 
some points better than I did.  Thanks you.  And your 
own reactions are clear and cogent.  I am delighted 
to have such a fine reviewer. 
 
DOOLL: OK, my turn to cut in...It's kinda like dancing, 
huh?! 
 
Mongo: Certainly not a sword fight. 
 
DOOLL: Oh good! I was hoping I didn't blow it 
somehow—it was fun for me, but I'd hate to have 
disappointed you. 
 
The [job] interview process of the last, ugh! TWO 
years has been horribly frustrating—I seem to be 
suffering from something analogous to the "always a 
bridesmaid, never a bride" type problem. However, 
this year seems more promising so keep your 
fingers, toes, etc. crossed for me! 
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Mongo: Even my eyes will be crossed. 
 
DOOLL: In the meantime, I have a humor question 
for you and would like you to help me make sense of 
the following experience: I was in line at the grocery 
store today and noticed a huge, red mess on the 
floor nearby. I said, "Geez, that looks like a crime 
scene!" Of course, it wasn't but I wasn't sure what it 
was and, fortunately, the man who dropped it 
laughed and said, "Yeah, what a waste of a good 
Merlot, huh?" One of the cashiers laughed too but 
then quickly covered his mouth because all of the 
other folks within earshot were wearing expressions 
of disapproval. Now, I've been in Bend long enough 
not to care what folks think of me but I'm always 
wondering about differences in what counts as 
funny and/or humorous. So, you tell me, did my quip 
count as humor? If so, where was the incongruity? If 
not, would you say it was merely a case of "funny-
ha-ha" that only two of us (plus my husband) 
laughed at??  
 
Mongo: Damn.  A real-life example to test a theory.  
So the theory is internally fairly consistent. Now it 
has to apply and explain?  I suspect your reaction 
was humor.  The inconsistency would be the 
different and clashing explanations of the liquid on 
the floor.  
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DOOLL: OK, so here's one more question I have 
regarding the incongruity condition for humor...Can 
there be different interpretations for what counts as 
incongruous? For example, I thought I was pointing 
out a different incongruity—namely, that it would be 
rather unexpected or surprising to find a "crime 
scene" at a supermarket check stand. Then again, 
depending on what markets one shops at…maybe 
not??  
 
Mongo: Incongruity is a function of the mindset.  
How is that for obscurity?  It is a function of what a 
person expects, what “fits” into that, and what 
doesn’t.  But the important part is the state of mind 
of the individual.  Someone distracted or anxious will 
probably not be able to play with the incongruity she 
notices.  Of course two people can see the same 
thing, and only one sees something that does not fit.  
One man’s incongruity is another man’s ordinary 
world. 
 
DOOLL: I suspect that this might explain, at least 
partly, why my attempts at humor fail around here 
more often than not. Not only do many people seem 
unaware of the incongruous, much less how fun it 
can be to play with them, they don't even seem to 
notice inconsistencies. All I know is, teaching logic or 
critical thinking at COCC was WAY harder than I 
could ever have imagined. This is because a large 
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number of students failed to understand what a 
contradiction was, let alone care about it! This also 
explains why they cut my position, cancelled all 
philosophy classes for over a year and now offer only 
two per term. 
 
Mongo:  What a weird decision.  I have always had 
an intrinsic suspicion of administrators.   
The merlot dropper may have been laughing from 
nervous energy, or maybe he too saw and 
appreciated the inconsistency.  Same with the clerk.    
Sometimes you can’t be sure of what other people 
are laughing at, and why, so you just use the WAG 
system (Wild-Assed Guess.)  The inconsistency was 
not strong, the laughs were hard to interpret, and 
overall it is hard to tell for sure. 
 
DOOLL: Yeah, that's the problem, isn't it?? Meaning, 
we can only see others' external behavior (laughter, 
pained expression, etc.), so it's virtually impossible 
to know the cause or causes of it. Even when it 
comes to understanding my own motives, I can't 
always tell or there's more than one explanation for 
why I did what I did. This is also the problem with 
psychological surveys that ask folks about their 
intentions, motives and so forth which is why I don't 
put much stock in them. The surveys which ask 
couples about sex and cheating really get me—
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mainly because I think we humans are pretty good at 
lying, even to (or especially to) ourselves… 
 
Mongo:  I think it was Nietzsche who said:  I will not 
lie, not even to myself.  Pretty hard to keep that 
commitment. 
 
In sum, we carried on like this for months, 
also sharing personal stories about our families, 
children or the lack thereof, etc. What I don’t believe 
Mongo knew was how painful my life was at the 
time. Not only was I in a chaotic mess-of-a-marriage, 
I was living in rural Oregon.  
When I told one of my urban-dwelling 
uncles that I’d landed there, he quipped, “Geez, you 
could have been kidnapped to a better place!” In 
other words, it was an unfamiliar place where I felt 
unusually alone and isolated—despite being married 
or, perhaps, because of it—and having never really 
dealt with the untimely deaths of my parents. I 
mention this only to underscore how grateful I am 
for Mongo’s substantive and regular email attention. 
His wisdom and generosity suggested a sense of 
community, however abstract, and his unrelenting 
sense of humor provided a delicious relief from 
those moments of despair. On a more rational and 
practical level, the exchange of ideas gave me the 
intellectual stimulation that I would not have had 
otherwise, and his work inspired me to get some 
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research, writing, and publishing done. For that, I 
remain forever in his debt. So, if he ever needs a 
kidney, there’s lien on one of mine with his name on 
it.   
I will close this tribute with a quote from 
Carrie Fisher—another brilliantly funny person who, 
sadly, is no longer sharing jokes with or among the 
living. In an interview shortly before she shuffled-off 
those mortal coils, she defended her penchant for 
self-deprecating and irreverent humor. Saying 
something to the effect of, “It creates community 
when you share private, embarrassing things and 
can find other people who share those things.” This 
is exactly the kind of kinship I experienced in my 
Mongo-encounters. It’s also why I remember Richard 
C. Richards so fondly and with such sheer delight. 
And, I will continue to do so for as long as I remain a 
part of this world. For all I know he may outlive me. 
If so, I hope he will recall me with equal fondness as 
more DOOLL than fool. 
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Aesthetics, Humor, and Virtue: Reflections on 
Richards and the Good Life 
Elizabeth Victor 
 
Introduction 
In A Philosopher Looks at the Sense of 
Humor, Richard C. Richards discusses how one's 
appreciation of and ability to create incongruities is a 
necessary condition for developing a sense of 
humor. One's sense of humor, according to Richards, 
can be a component of happiness. In this paper, I will 
build on Richards's concept of the sense of humor. I 
will argue that Richards account is consistent with an 
Aristotelian picture of happiness as holistic well-
being. Specifically, I will suggest that the attitude 
underlying the aesthetic and/or the humorous is a 
kind of pro-attitude that must be cultivated (i.e., one 
is not simply born with a developed sense of humor). 
I argue that a sense of humor, as an Aristotelian 
virtue, is consistent with Richards’s developmental 
account of a sense of humor. However, I am making 
a stronger claim than Richards; I will argue that the 
sense of humor is necessary for happiness. In this 
way, I am filling out Richards’s account of the role 
one's sense of humor plays in one's long-term 
happiness. Since a good Aristotelian will offer 
examples to elucidate the intermediate position 
between the extremes, I offer an analysis of Richards 
own writings and behavior as exemplifying an 
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excellent sense of humor, one that has served as a 
model for others to emulate the kind of play 
necessary to "transform a simple incongruity into 
the stuff of humor". 
 
Richards’ Theory of The Sense of Humor 
In Chapter five of his book, Richards tells us 
that a sense of humor is a “kind of aesthetic 
experience” that is a playful engagement with 
incongruities. He explains, “[s]ince humor is a 
response to the incongruous, the sense of humor is 
the mental capacity…to playfully discover or create 
unexpected and surprising combinations of 
elements” (Richards 2013, 71). He employs a 
developmental account to explain how one goes 
about training up a sense of humor, telling the 
reader that attitudes (a sense of humor being one of 
them) are “a set of habits with which we approach 
life.” Said habits are learned early, Richards tells us, 
including one’s sense of humor. We can see 
evidence for this in the way that children play with 
incongruities—trying on a sense of humor when they 
first learn how to tell a knock-knock joke. I was 
recently around some small children, and they were 
tickled pink by the silliness of the incongruities 
within these kinds of jokes. Here are a couple of 
choice knock-knock jokes:  
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Knock, knock! 
Who’s there? 
Cow Says! 
Cow Says who?  
No silly, cow says ‘moo’ not ‘who’  
 
Knock, knock! 
Who’s there? 
Boo! 
Boo who? 
Oh don’t cry, it’s just a joke 
 
These sorts of jokes capture what Richards 
calls “the sense of the funny.” We might think of the 
sense of the funny as a nascent sense of humor. As 
Richards indicates, “[t]o become the sense of humor, 
the sense of the funny must become habitual… [a]n 
attitude involving the development of appreciation 
of incongruities must occur” (ibid, 77). From the 
habitual “play” with a sense of the funny, we 
develop a sense of humor through the cultivation of 
the aesthetic appreciation of incongruities (ibid, 77-
78).  
This cultivation of an aesthetic attitude or 
stance toward incongruities is what gives the sense 
of humor value, over and above a cheap thrill or 
temporary amusement. Beyond eliciting “happy 
laughter” from others, a sense of humor allows us to 
face the difficult fact that we’re all going to die, and 
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everyone we know will die, and life is likely 
meaningless.  The cultivation of the sense of humor, 
as a form of art, gives us power over the fact that 
we’re mere mortals, and that is something that gives 
humor value above and beyond the instrumental use 
of humor in, the classroom, or the hospital…or the 
bedroom. This stance or pro-attitude that underlies 
the sense of humor directly contributes to a person’s 
well-being.      
Yet, even as Richards maintains that a sense 
of humor has a role in happiness, he seems to stop 
just short of claiming that a sense of humor is 
necessary for a person to be happy. A person might, 
for instance, develop other coping mechanisms to 
help him through life’s rough patches, building a 
fulfilling life without having acquired a sense of 
humor. However, he hedges this claim in the very 
next paragraph as he states, “I think a person can be 
happy without having or experiencing joy and 
delight, but it would be a rare person who could do 
this…a sense of humor is in almost all cases 
necessary for a happy life” (ibid, 114-15).    
 
Richard and Aristotle Walk into a Bar (and they both 
say ouch!) 
On my interpretation, it seems that 
Richards is suggesting that the attitude underlying 
the aesthetic and/or the humorous is a kind of pro-
attitude that must be cultivated (i.e., one is not 
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simply born with a developed sense of humor). In 
this next section, I argue that a sense of humor, as 
an Aristotelian virtue, is consistent with Richards 
developmental account of a sense of humor, but I 
don’t think Richards goes far enough. In building on 
Richards arguments, I will make the further claim 
that the sense of humor is necessary for happiness.  
 
Aristotle on Humor 
Some might argue that what Aristotle 
considered wit was quite narrow, maybe too narrow 
to capture the range of funny stuff Richards 
discusses. Aristotle goes so far as to hint that some 
kinds of joking ought to be outlawed. Specifically, he 
states, “since a joke is a type of abuse, and 
legislators prohibit some types of abuse, [the 
legislators] would presumably be right to prohibit 
some types of jokes” (Aristotle 1999, 66). John 
Morreal, for instance, interprets this passage as 
evidence that “though Aristotle considered wit a 
valuable part of conversation (Nicomachean Ethics 4, 
8), he agreed with Plato that laughter expresses 
scorn.” (Morreal 2016). What is clear is that Aristotle 
presents wit as one of the virtues and he discusses 
humor in Rhetoric.  
In Book II, Chapter 8, section 13 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle first presents us with 
the virtue of wit. He describes wit as the 
intermediate position between buffoonery and 
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boorishness (Aristotle 1999, 26). In a more detailed 
explanation of the virtue of wit, in Book Book IV, 
Chapter 8, Aristotle states that wit is a matter of 
character as he says, “[t]hose who go to excess in 
raising laughs seem to be vulgar buffoons…[t]hose 
who would never say anything themselves to raise a 
laugh, and even object when other people do it, 
seem to be boorish and stiff. Those who joke in 
appropriate ways are called agile-witted. For these 
sorts of jokes seem to be movements of someone’s 
character…” (ibid, 65, my emphasis). Aristotle 
cautions that we must be discriminate in our use of 
humor, being sure to pay attention to context and 
our audience, as he says that if humor is to 
contribute to relaxation and amusement, one must 
“…say and listen to the right things and in the right 
way. The company we are in when we speak or listen 
also makes a difference” (ibid.). In this way, the wit, 
as a virtue, is like many other virtues, we must be 
trained up through practice and wise counsel.  
Aristotle is short on the details of how we 
go about training up the virtue of wit, but he does 
give us an account of humor that is similar to the 
incongruity theory Richards depends upon. In 
Rhetoric (III, 2), Aristotle presents us with something 
akin to the incongruity theory of humor. He states, 
“[t]he effect is produced even by jokes depending 
upon changes of the letters of a word; this too is a 
surprise. You find this in verse as well as in prose. 
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The word which comes is not what the hearer 
imagined.” (Aristotle 1941) For Aristotle, the 
laughter expressed comes from the incongruity 
between the joke and the facts of the world. When 
taken in combination with his explanation of wit in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, it makes sense why one 
would need to know his audience. Incongruities 
change, depending upon context and audience 
education level, gender, life experiences, etc. For 
instance, if I’m at a party with a bunch of MDs, I 
might use the pun “Conjunctivitis.com — that’s a site 
for sore eyes”, but this joke would fall flat with my 
siblings. If I’m in a room full of philosophers, I might 
say “Zeno walks half way into a bar…”, but again, this 
joke would fall flat with just about everyone in my 
family. Knowing the audience is crucial to the apt 
exercise of wit.  
 
The Role of Wit in Happiness (Eudemonia) 
The link between joking and pain, when 
taken in conjunction with Aristotle’s stress that wit 
be expressed in the right place, at the right time, 
gives us insight into how wit is tied to happiness. The 
cultivation of an attitude to see incongruities, and 
play on incongruities that appear in our lives can, as 
Richards indicates, act as a coping mechanism. 
Developing a means to alleviate the tension or face 
our own mortality (or the mortality of those we 
love), will certainly help us cultivate virtue in other 
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areas of our lives. Indeed, if we fail to cultivate an 
appreciation of incongruities, we may be deficient in 
other facets of our moral lives. Being deficient in one 
area of our character may erode other facets of our 
character as well. For instance, if we never really 
“get” a joke or appreciate a double entendre, this 
might undermine our friendships, incite anger when 
we don’t get that something is said in jest, or act as a 
barrier to being pleasant (can you imagine how 
frustrating it might be to not get a joke; being a 
person that only laughs for social cohesion?). In 
addition, I find it hard to imagine, as Richards 
implies, what other coping mechanisms might 
function as a sense of humor does. For instance, 
exercise is certainly good stress relief, or so they tell 
me, and it may help reduce my rage, but does it 
really help others reduce stress or face the hardships 
of life?  
There is an inherent social dimension to a 
sense of humor that is other-oriented, connecting to 
the sense of political that Aristotle tells us is part of 
our essence. Other coping mechanisms seem to 
differ insofar as they are self-centered. No doubt, 
humor and laughter can be self-centered, but it need 
not be. Moreover, the virtue of wit and the sense of 
humor, as described by Richards, is responsive to 
one’s environment; in a word, responsive to others 
in a way that restores our humanity and recognizes 
the humanity in others. It is this dimension of the 
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sense of humor—the fact that it calls us to attend to 
the environment around us and others that makes it 
an essential element of well-being. Of course, to 
develop a sense of humor, like any virtue, requires 
that we have role models to help us cultivate wit.   
 
Developing ‘The Sense of the Funny’ into ‘The Sense 
of Humor’  
Moral education is an essential aspect of 
developing virtuous habits, and Aristotle stresses the 
importance of role models for us to emulate. Toward 
that end, I propose that Richard C. Richards be 
considered a role model for exercising wit, 
particularly within professional academic 
philosophy. I offer three examples to help illustrate 
my point:    
 
Autobiography of Richard C. Richards (on 
amazon.com) 
Now that I’ve gone through all of the dry 
material—let me get to the good stuff! If there ever 
was evidence that Richards is a man of wit, let me 
submit, for your consideration, his autobiography 
that he posted on his Amazon.com profile. I 
stumbled upon this beauty while I was getting a free 
copy of his book from kindle:  
I remember little of my conception and 
birth. I assume it took place, but I was not in a 
position to appreciate it. It was all just a whirl of 
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chromosomes and genes. Plus a rude exit into the 
world at Moscow, Idaho. They tell me it was in 1935. 
They could be wrong. I had what was, compared 
with children today, an idyllic youth, spent in an 
atmosphere of no TV and other digital devices, 
mostly because they had not been invented yet. We 
roamed the fields and woods near Boise, Idaho, 
fished, and threw rocks at Neanderthals, who were 
plentiful at the time.  
A move to Santa Barbara, California, after 
the late, great WWII introduced me to the world of 
thinking, stimulated and occasionally threatened by 
some really great teachers at both Santa Barbara 
High School and the University of California, Santa 
Barbara. At the latter I discovered my true vocation, 
but became a philosopher instead. UCLA put the cap 
on my bottle of education, and I spent nearly forty 
years teaching at California State Polytechnic on a 
one-year temporary appointment. I got all the 
mileage out of that appointment I could.  
My first marriage produced one son, 
Randal, who produced nine grandchildren, who 
produced four great grandchildren so far. A 
wonderful marriage to Marlene "Marty" Richards 
has added immeasurably to my life.  The philosophy 
of humor has interested me for years, and with 
retirement, I decided to write the book, A 
Philosopher Looks at The Sense of Humor. It has a 
serious intent and a humorous approach. That way I 
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can offend a larger number of people: both the 
humorous and the serious. My funeral occurred 
several years ago, but it did not take. But I got to put 
the fun back in FUNeral. (Richards n.d.) 
You can’t make this shit up—and yet he 
does! It’s glorious—funny, punny, loaded with 
examples of incongruities that you have to both 
laugh at and appreciate.  
 
Putting the Fun in Funeral 
This next anecdote serves as further 
evidence of Richards’s wit—it’s not just something 
he crafts in writing, but something he has cultivated 
through action. Some of you may be wondering 
what it means to put the “fun back in FUNeral”; 
allow me to elaborate. Now I don’t know all the 
details, but as legend has it, some number of years 
ago, Richard C. Richards actually faked his own death 
and arranged his own funeral. At said funeral, he 
greeted people with t-shirts that actually said 
“putting the fun back in FUN-eral”! Could you 
imagine?  
Speaking of funerals—I think Jerry Seinfeld 
said it best, “According to most studies, people's 
number one fear is public speaking. Number two is 
death. Death is number two. Does that sound right? 
This means to the average person, if you go to a 
funeral, you're better off in the casket than doing 
the eulogy.” This is actually true—several surveys 
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ranking people’s fears have confirmed that people 
actually fear speaking more than death (Croston 
2011). Unless you’re Richard, then you speak at your 
own funeral!  
 
Author-meets-Critics Sessions   
For Richards, the sense of humor is not 
something to be checked at the door of academic 
philosophy. If anything, that’s where the 
incongruities shine the brightest. As some of you 
may know, Richards has been a regular contributor 
to the Lighthearted Philosophers’ Society annual 
conference, both as a presenting author and as a 
heckler. He has really has been one of the 
foundational figures and has had a heavy hand in 
shaping this organization, shoring us up when we 
just started to ensure we could continue 
philosophizing over the good, bad, and ugly jokes for 
years to come. These are some of the many reasons 
why we honor him with the Richard C. Richards 
almost memorial prize. That’s right—that prize 
money is, well, I wouldn’t call it sugar-daddy money, 
Splenda-daddy money—that’s what it is!  
One of the most memorable 
“presentations” involving Richards was the Author-
Meets-Critics session on his book A Philosopher 
Looks At The Sense of Humor. Turning the traditional 
APA-style panel on its head, Richards was joined by 
three hecklers: Tom Brommage, Steve Gimbel, and 
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Eugene Zaldivar. Instead of the stuffy, traditional 
panel, the author met with heckles and jeers, for a 
lively roast of the book. Chock-full of dick jokes, rips 
on Richard’s age, and good old-fashioned jabs, the 
hecklers incorporated a good amount of 
philosophical analysis into their bit. As a member of 
the audience, it was fascinating to watch and really 
set the example of what this organization is about: 
doing serious work, all the while not taking yourself 
(or your work) too seriously. I don’t want you to take 
my word for it, though, so I’ve garnered some 
additional evidence from one of the hecklers—
Eugene Zaldivar.  
Zaldivar was kind enough to offer additional 
evidence from this author-meets-critics session. In a 
recent correspondence, he told me of some choice 
quotes that Richards asked to use for promotional 
materials (on the book’s website or the book jacket). 
What, pray tell, were these words of high praise? 
Zaldivar said, “I'd like to start by admitting that I 
found this to be a really nice book. It has all of the 
hallmarks of a classic. It's printed on paper. It has a 
lemur on the cover. It's written by a human with a 
sense of humor. Yup, a really nice book. Richard 
notes that one can disgust by using humor. Reading 
this book is proof that this is true.” Richards was sure 
to carefully couch his request, noting, “[m]y editor 
may come up with some other dastardly way to use 
the quotes, with, of course, proper citation of 
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academic affiliation, thereby all but guaranteeing 
that you will be fired and disgraced as a philosopher 
and as a person. It would be a favor to me if you 
would agree to any part of the above requests.  If 
not, I respect your good judgment” (Victor 2018). 
Zaldivar kindly agreed, noting that he didn’t want to 
appear unkind with the “disgust” bit. He shared this 
with me for two reasons; as he explained, “[f]irst, it 
shows his humility and sense of humor. In picking 
two quotes that are clearly meant to be digs at his 
expense he shows that he doesn't take himself too 
seriously and that he can appreciate humor even 
when he's the butt of the joke. In addition, the fact 
that I trusted his instincts shows the respect I have 
for him. I can think of many other people who I'd be 
less willing to entrust with material that is less than 
well-mannered” (ibid.).   
The second anecdote, Zaldivar offers is from 
last year's panel on Steve Gimbel's book, where he 
read Richards’s review:  
The first major criticism is that trying to 
understand humor through comedy is a gigantic, 
super-colossal mistake. Comedy is a performance 
art. Humor involves the sense of humor in a 
wonderful way. Approaching humor through the 
mid-wifery of comedy leaves important insights 
unaccounted for. Those insights include the role of 
the sense of humor in the creation of comedy, and in 
the enhancement of human existence. Minor 
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considerations, of course, but monumental 
nonetheless…With a remarkable grasp of the field of 
the Philosophy of Humor, Steven has introduced a 
productive new perspective into the philosophical 
brew from which the dove of acceptance of the 
Philosophy of Humor is now emerging. His 
background as a stand-up comedian gives us all fresh 
insights into older problems and brings up a few new 
ones in addition (ibid.). 
As Zaldivar explains, “[i]n the first line 
Richard gives a fairly strong critique (he clearly 
disagrees with Steve!) but does so with humor and 
self-deprecation in order to take some of the sting 
out of the criticism. In the hands of a lesser person 
this could have been a very contentious point. And 
then he adds some very nice comments about Steve 
and the book at the end” (ibid.). These examples are 
meant to illustrate how Richards has served as a 
model of incorporating humor into academic 
settings. As Zaldivar interprets them, these kinds of 
examples “demonstrate a kindness of spirit, sense of 
humor and sharp understanding of the material that 
are individually in short supply and almost unheard 
in aggregate” (ibid.). Until the Lighthearted 
Philosophers’ Society, I had thought seriously about 
humor, but I had never seriously exercised wit, and I 
definitely didn’t have a sense of humor about 
academic philosophy. For me, developing a sense of 
humor has been essential to my well-being when 
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navigating the bullshit that is the academic market, 
overcoming flagrant instances of sexism and 
misogyny (in general and at academic conferences in 
particular), and the shit show that is “making it” in 
this profession.  How to do this, and how to do it 
well, is something that I’m learning from Richard, 
and others who emulate him. Lest this be a big kiss-
ass session, I’ll end by saying that I hope to hear 
more about how Richards regards the limits of the 
sense of humor, and how one could be happy or 
have a fulfilling life without a sense of humor.  
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Richard Richards, Robert Roberts, and Aristotelian 
Aristotelianism 
Steve Gimbel 
 
 This paper is a tribute to a philosopher and 
a person I have long admired, Richard C. Richards.  
As a clear and rigorous thinker, a thoughtful and 
accessible writer, and as a kind, blunt, and extremely 
funny person, Richard embodies virtues I hope to 
someday claim as well.   
 It is, I believe, fitting, to begin this tribute to 
Richard by considering the philosophical work of 
someone else entirely.  Richard has a well-developed 
sense of humor, something he defines as the 
attitude to properly appreciate incongruities, and 
the idea of honoring one person by discussing the 
work of another is surely the sort of incongruity he 
has the attitude to appreciate. 
 The other philosopher I want to begin 
discussing in order to honor Richard C. Richards is 
another prominent name in the philosophy of 
humor, Robert C. Roberts.  Roberts is emeritus from 
Wheaton College, that is, the Wheaton College in 
Illinois, not the Wheaton College in Massachusetts.  
(I want to be perfectly clear that we are talking 
about Robert Roberts from Wheaton, not Robert 
Roberts from Wheaton.)  Richard Richards and 
Robert Roberts, we will see, are similar in that the 
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accounts of humor they give come from a 
commitment to an Aristotelian foundation.    
Robert Roberts is quite explicit about this in 
his article “Humor and the Virtues.”  In this piece, 
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, begins by 
adopting an incongruity account of humor.  For both 
Robert Roberts and Richard Richards, an act is 
humorous only if it includes an incongruity that is at 
least perceived by the person finding the act 
humorous (more than perception may be required, 
but the perception of the incongruity is at least a 
necessary condition for an act to be an act of 
humor). 
Robert Roberts, like Richard Richards, is not 
interested in humor theory for the sake of humor 
theory, but hopes to find how we ought to think 
about humor as embedded in the lived life.   
The key to perceiving incongruities for the 
sake of humor, according to Robert Roberts, is 
“perspectivity.”  When we see something as 
incongruous, what we are often doing is seeing the 
same thing from multiple perspectives.  By seeing 
the same thing through different interpretive lenses, 
we can make sense of the same thing in different, 
perhaps contrasting, ways.   
This perspectivity, he argues, requires 
dissociation, that is, (a) the ability for us to recognize 
that there is a perspective other than our own to be 
occupied, and (b) the ability to then occupy this 
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alternative perspective.  To develop a sense of 
humor, that is, to be able to recognize humor, one 
needs to always be aware that one is perceiving 
through a perspective which is not the only possible 
perspective.   
He does not, however, contend that all is 
mere perspective.  He is committed to the existence 
of an objective reality.  So, we must not attribute to 
Robert Roberts a perspectival perspectivalism, but 
rather a more limited perspectivalism which he 
terms “soft perspectivalism.”  There is a real world, 
he holds, but we experience it from one of many 
possible angles. 
Humor is to found in simultaneously 
understanding: (1) the perception of the object of 
the perception from our perspective, (2) that there is 
another perspective from which the object of 
perception may be perceived, (3) the perception of 
the object of perception from the alternative 
perspective, and (4) that there is an incongruity 
between the two perceptions despite the fact that 
they are perceptions of the same object being 
perceived.  Sometimes, but only sometimes, this 
incongruity will be of the proper sort to be 
humorous.  A sense of humor is the ability to 
distinguish the proper from the improper cases. 
The question he ultimately seeks to answer 
in setting this out is whether a sense of humor ought 
to be considered a virtue, or at least something 
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capable of enhancing one’s moral education which 
he works out in terms of character development 
which in turn is worked out in terms of virtues.  This 
is where the Aristotelianism is fully transparent. 
This gets ramped up further with Robert 
Roberts’ contention that each person possesses both 
a character and a nature and that virtue is the state 
of one’s character being brought into line with one’s 
nature.  To recognize that there is a gap between 
one’s character and one’s nature is to see oneself in 
two different ways as being two different things.  
This is an incongruity and can, through proper 
dissociation and perspectivity, allow one to laugh at 
one’s own flaws and foibles.  This, then, puts us in a 
place of objective knowledge about what we need to 
improve in ourselves and that is crucial to personal 
growth.  In Robert Roberts’ own words, 
 
“The concept of a virtue implies the concept 
of a human nature.  To possess a virtue is to 
be ‘qualified’ as having to that extent 
realized one’s nature, as having become in 
actuality what one inevitably was in 
potentiality.  The concept of a virtue is thus 
the concept of a congruity between one’s 
character and one’s nature, and thus of the 
live possibility of lacking congruity between 
character and nature – of falling short of 
one’s telos.  Given this, the form of humor 
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closely connected with the virtues would be 
a representation of moral failures as 
incongruities.  To perceive such 
incongruities in oneself and others would 
be a mark of moral knowledge, and the 
disposition to perceive them could be 
counted as an important part of wisdom.  In 
so far as wisdom is a virtue which pervades 
the others – there being wisdom concerning 
justice, wisdom concerning truth-telling, 
wisdom about situations calling for courage, 
etc. – the moral sense of humor would 
perhaps apply, with differences, to the 
whole range of virtues (Roberts, p. 130).” 
 
We see in Robert Roberts’ writing that a sense of 
humor may be an aid to becoming a more virtuous 
person, in other words, an aid in our moral 
education. 
 Let us now turn from Robert Roberts to 
Richard Richards.  Richard Richards, like Robert 
Roberts, contends that we possess a character and, 
like Aristotle, holds character to be comprised of 
attitudes and proclivities that we develop through 
our choices and our actions.  Like Robert Roberts, 
Richard Richards is committed to a real reality and 
among that which may be considered objective is 
humor.  It is an objective fact of the world if 
something is humorous and those with a developed 
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sense of humor will be the accomplished judges that 
we can turn to in order to see whether an act was, in 
fact, humorous. 
 So, what is it to have a sense of humor 
according to Richard?  In his words, 
 
“A sense of humor is an attitude or set of 
attitudes that involve a tendency to notice, 
explore, and sometimes create 
incongruities, and to appreciate them in a 
playful way that is usually pleasurable 
(Richards, p. 72).” 
 
A sense of humor is thus, first and foremost, an 
attitude or set of attitudes.   What is an attitude? 
 
“An attitude is a habitual psychological 
structure that influences and often controls 
what we perceive, that is, what we think 
and feel, and the beliefs we have about 
those things we perceive and feel.  Though 
the term ‘attitude’ has, in common usage, 
come to mean mostly a bad or hostile 
attitude, I am using the term much more 
generally.  Roughly, an attitude is a set of 
habits with which we approach life, and 
many attitudes are learned early in life 
(Richards, pp. 72-3).” 
 
77 
 
As with Robert Roberts, we see with Richard 
Richards, a firm commitment to a practical 
Aristotelianism. 
 A sense of humor for Richard is thus an 
attitude.  It is an attitude which leads to the 
appreciation of incongruities.  Let us take the notion 
of incongruity to be well-understood and well-
defined (ignoring Robert Latta’s objections here).  
The question remaining is therefore, “What is it to 
appreciate an incongruity?”  Richard answers, 
 
“The act of appreciating involves 
recognizing the worth of something.  It 
involves the discovery or creation of value.  
You have to have some sort of knowledge in 
order to appreciate something. That also 
distinguishes it from simple cases of liking.  
You can like something without recognizing 
its worth or value.  You can value something 
without liking it.  The recognition of value or 
worth involves the possession of some kind 
of knowledge other than that involved in 
liking (Richards, p. 76).” 
 
Appreciating something, an incongruity or 
otherwise, involves specialized knowledge which 
some may possess and others not.  In this way, we 
see John Stuart Mill’s famous passage from 
Utilitarianism being obliquely referred to in which 
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there are some who have developed a proclivity that 
makes them superior judges of value.  “It is better to 
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different 
opinion, it is only because they only know their own 
side of the question. (Mill, p. 10).”  In the same way, 
if a person with a developed sense of humor finds 
something funny and someone else does not, the 
person without the developed sense of humor is 
wrong about the objective fact of the humorousness 
of the object. 
 The sense of humor as Richard Richards sets 
it out does not require an objective human nature.  
It is a desirable development in the character of a 
person, but not a failure of character the way Robert 
Roberts would have.  As such, what we see in 
Richard Richards’ conception of the human and the 
sense of humor is something akin to Kant’s notion of 
an imperfect duty.  It is a good to develop it, but not 
something morally necessary. 
 But its development is not direct.  
According to Richard, the development of a sense of 
humor requires first that one develop a sense of the 
funny.   
 
“The sense of the funny is a skill at 
determining where a person is likely to find 
the amusing, rather than simply waiting for 
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something to happen which causes laughs.  
It also includes a habitual understanding of 
when it is appropriate to laugh and when it 
is not (Richards, p. 77).” 
 
As a child, one develops a sense of the funny, but 
then as an adult one may go farther and develop a 
full-fledged sense of humor. 
 
“When does the sense of the funny become 
the sense of humor?  It varies in individual 
cases.  We hone the ability to laugh at the 
proper times.  From this proceeds the 
ability to appreciate the incongruities of life.  
It takes more learning for a person to have 
a sense of humor than to learn to laugh 
when others laugh, to laugh when someone 
says something that is called ‘funny’ and we 
feel obliged to laugh (Richards, p. 78).” 
 
So, where Robert Roberts gives us an account of the 
sense of humor that comes not only from a 
commitment to a virtue ethics, but also a 
commitment to the underlying metaphysical picture 
of the human being, we can say that Robert Roberts 
has an Aristotelian Aristotelianism.  Richard 
Richards, unlike Robert Roberts, does not have an 
Aristotelian Aristotelianism.  Richard Richards’ 
Aristotelianism is more intricate.  He invokes the sort 
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of levels of knowledge being morally relevant that 
we find in Mill.  He makes the sense of humor a 
desirable property along the lines of the imperfect 
duties of Kant.  And he makes the development of it 
a stepwise evolutionary process of the sort we find 
in Hegel.  Therefore, we can say that Richard has a 
Kantian Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism.   
 I love the phrase “Kantian Hegelian Millian 
Aristotelianism” because it might be a convoluted 
way of saying something straightforward which 
would make it quite Kantian.  It might be a 
convoluted way of saying absolutely nothing, which 
would make it quite Hegelian.  Or it might just lead 
one to have a nervous breakdown which would 
make it quite Millian. 
 I will mention the title of one of my favorite 
papers in the philosophy of language at this point by 
Nathan Salmon.  His goal in this article is to revive 
John Stuart Mill’s approach to language and is titled, 
“How to be a Millian Heir.”  I do not bring this up 
because it has any relevance at all to the points I am 
making here, but rather because this is my paper 
and I will talk about whatever the fuck I want. 
 So, we have with Robert Roberts and 
Richard Richards, two contrasting Aristotelian 
accounts of the sense of humor.  Robert Roberts is 
an Aristotelian Aristotelian where Richard Richards is 
not an Aristotelian Aristotelian, but rather a Kantian 
Hegelian Millian Aristotelian.   
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 Which of the two ought we prefer?  To 
weigh the two alternatives with an eye toward 
seeing which is stronger, I propose we look to 
Richard Richards.  Not Richard Richards – that would 
be to engage in circular reasoning precisely because 
the reasoning would be circular.  Rather, Richard 
Richards, by which I mean not Richard C. Richards, 
the beloved member of the Lighthearted 
Philosophers Society and emeritus philosopher of 
aesthetics, ethics, and love and sex from Cal Poly, 
Pomona, but rather Richard A. Richards, professor of 
philosophy with a focus on the philosophy of biology 
at the University of Alabama.  (That’s the University 
of Alabama not in Birmingham, but in Tuscaloosa, 
real Alabama – Richard Richards from Alabama 
Alabama).  Richard A. Richards toured the world as a 
professional, classical dancer before he became a 
professional philosopher, completing his graduate 
work at Johns Hopkins where we took graduate 
seminars in philosophy of science together.  I pride 
myself on perhaps being the only person who is 
friends with both Richard Richardses. 
 As one would expect from an expert on 
evolutionary explanation, Richard Richards gives an 
account of aesthetic judgment which is modeled 
upon the Darwinian concept of fitness.  Evolutionary 
fitness, Richards argues, is a three-place relationship 
among the property, the organism, and the context 
in which the organism finds itself.  It is the 
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contextual piece that is essential here.  No property 
is itself good for an organism in general, but only 
good in terms of its context.  That context may be 
internal – that is, advantageous in terms of the 
relations of the parts of the organisms – or external 
– that is, advantageous in relation to some 
environmental factor.  But whether it is an internal 
or external context, we have to see fitness as a 
function of its functional context.  Fitness for Richard 
Richards is a function of function. 
 Richard Richards’ own fitness, for example, 
has been significantly aided by the contextual factor 
of his avoiding gluten.  He told me he dropped 
fifteen pounds.  Dude looked good last time I was 
down in Alabama. 
 Just as with evolutionary fitness, so too with 
artistic fitness. We have to see fitness as a three-
place relation connecting a property of the work 
(e.g., unity, complexity, or intensity), the work as a 
whole, and the context of the work.  Again, the 
functional context may be internal – that is, a 
function of the property understood fully within the 
work itself, such as color relationships, composition, 
or form – or it may be external – that is, an aspect of 
the social, historical, or political context in which the 
artistic work is appreciated. 
 As a philosopher with a strong biological 
background, he points out that a number of the 
properties we judge positively in works of art are 
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direct results of our cognitive structure which 
directly results from our brains being the product of 
evolutionary processes.  The human brain, for 
example, is outstanding at edge detection because 
we naturally engage in lateral inhibition wherein the 
brain naturally exaggerates the contrast in light 
values when darker and lighter areas are juxtaposed.  
This is why we will naturally project boundaries and 
edges onto pieces like pointillist works in which none 
exist. 
 As such, our appreciation of art – and we 
can argue by extension, humor – is a function of our 
function as humans.  This is very much in line with 
the sort of Aristotelian Aristotelianism of Robert 
Roberts as it posits universal human properties 
which we can see as the sort of human nature 
Roberts requires. 
 But Richard Richards also contends that the 
external context is crucial to understanding our 
understanding of art.  We acquire categories 
through education and the more educated one is, 
the better one is as a judge of artistic quality.   
 
“The experience of an artwork will 
therefore vary depending on which features 
we believe to be standard, variable, and 
contra-standard, and that depends on 
experience and learning.  Consequently, 
functional context – and functioning – will 
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vary depending on the presence of this kind 
of knowledge in those who experience the 
work (Richards, p. 267).” 
 
Further, the acquired knowledge affects how we 
perceive, not just how we interpret what we 
perceive. 
 
“Education can affect the experience of an 
artwork in other ways.  Experiments have 
shown that formal training influences visual 
scan paths in the scrutiny of the artwork 
(ibid.).” 
 
If we take humor to be an artistic category, then this 
approach is precisely in line with the sort of Kantian 
Hegelian Millian Aristotelianism espoused by Richard 
Richards. 
 So, while Richard Richards may be seen at 
first to side with Robert Roberts against Richard 
Richards, in the end it does seem that Richard 
Richards supports Richard Richards over Robert 
Roberts.  But he does not fully locate himself on 
either extreme, instead contending that the correct 
answer is to be found in the mean between two 
extremes.  So, while Richard Richards may not 
espouse an Aristotelian Aristotelianism; Richard 
Richards, on the other hand, can be thought of as 
adopting an Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism.  
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But Richard Richards’ Aristotelian Aristotelian 
Aristotelianism does not support Robert Roberts’ 
Aristotelian Aristotelianism, rather Richard Richards’ 
Aristotelian Aristotelian Aristotelianism supports 
Richard Richards’ Kantian Hegelian Millian 
Aristotelianism.  So, we must conclude that in this 
case, we should agree with Richard.  That is, Richard, 
not Richard.  But we agree with Richard because 
Richard agrees with Richard. 
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Richard Richards is a Gay Scientist 
Dave Monroe 
 
A little recognized and under-appreciated 
fact about the august Richard Richards is that he is a 
gay scientist.  I know what you may be thinking—
Richard’s never shagged dudes, and if he has, it’s 
shitty to out him in an essay that’s meant to honor 
him.  That’s strictly his business. Or you may be 
thinking that that Richard identifies as a philosopher, 
not a physicist, biologist, or even (egads!) a 
psychologist.  As far as I know, you would be right in 
both cases—and it would be terrible to call him out--
despite the fact that this will hardly rise to the level 
of an essay.   
No, what I mean is that Richard Richards 
practices the sort of approach to philosophy that 
Nietzsche prescribes in The Gay Science.  Now, I 
won’t pretend to know fuckall about Nietzsche—but 
that’s okay because there are roughly 7,500 budding 
philosophy majors lurking in coffee shops, craft 
breweries, and organic grocery stores around the 
country who’ve got him figured out and would be 
delighted to expound on my ignorance.  If you are 
genuinely curious about whether I’ve got Nietzsche 
right, ask one of them. Or read some Nietzsche.  In 
any case, I’m not entirely convinced that getting 
philosophers “right” is the point; rather, good 
philosophers plunder brilliant ideas from better 
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philosophers or scientists, looting those concepts for 
their own ends–just ask Schopenhauer—and I think 
Richard might agree with this (c.f., his devotion to 
Provine and incongruity theory).   
But let me try to clarify my meaning.  The 
very title of Nietzsche’s work, The Gay Science, as 
well as many of the passages contained therein (no 
bloody citations forthcoming) suggests that 
systematic inquiry (wissenschaft: obligatory use of a 
foreign word to give gravity to this paper) into very 
serious subjects can be approached with a 
lighthearted spirit of joy.  It is in this sense that I 
mean Richard is a gay scientist. 
It goes without saying that most 
philosophers take themselves, and their work, far 
too seriously.  It’s understandable, of course.  Most 
of us spend so much time steeped not only in our 
particular areas of study but also fighting for tenure, 
or struggling to demonstrate the legitimacy of our 
field, that we lose sight of our own provincialism. It 
might be worth remembering that the average 
person would literally consider these debates the 
raving of lunatics.  Richard cannot be counted 
among those who’ve lost this perspective.   There’s 
nothing he won’t laugh at, including his own demise.  
As we all know, he’s committed to putting the ‘fun’ 
back in ‘funeral.’  Won’t that be a sight?  Let’s hope 
that day isn’t soon. 
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Richard is funny.  There’s no doubt about 
that.  He’s especially deft with “dad jokes,” which I 
suppose is appropriate, and, given his age, we might 
rename them “great-great-great-great-great-great-
grand dad jokes” in his honor.  Richard actually took 
lectures from Nietzsche at the University of Basel.  
It’s a little known fact that Nietzsche resigned in 
1879 due to Richard’s being a thorn in his side.  
There’s also no doubt that Richard is a very good 
philosopher—all jokes aside—and, most importantly, 
that Richard not only philosophizes about humor, 
but integrates humor in his philosophy.  His work is 
both risible and rigorous simultaneously. With all 
due respect to other funny philosophers, it is my 
considered judgment that no one strikes the balance 
so perfectly.  He is a living rejoinder to Joseph Ellin’s 
claim (in the very first paper read at the Lighthearted 
Philosophers’ Society) that philosophy cannot be 
funny.  Richard shows us that Old Joe is dead wrong.  
And just dead, for that matter, though we miss him 
dearly.   
I would be remiss if I didn’t recount 
Richard’s heroic courage and willingness to tackle 
tough issues head on, too.  That’s a pretty 
Nietzschean quality, I think.  In the spring of 2013, I 
invited Richard and Steve “The Checksecutioner” 
Gimbel (so named because he rakes in cash with his 
side gigs) to give the Annual Keith Goree Memorial 
Ethics Lecture at St. Petersburg College.  The Goree 
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Lecture honors one of my former colleagues, who, 
incidentally, was a charter member and early 
financial supporter of the Lighthearted Philosophers’ 
Society. Two founding members dead already?  
Damn.  Richard’s probably next.  
Anyway, the lecture is a showcase event for 
my department and the college; we typically shell 
out big bucks for relatively famous people with 
moderately interesting things to say about boring 
contemporary social issues.  I was able to throw 
Richard and Steve a couple of ducats and pay for 
them to visit Florida, so, essentially, I misused public 
funds so I could hang out with friends.  Let’s recall, 
after all, that was the initial mission of the LPS.  They 
agreed to talk about the ethics of humor, which I 
thought fitting because Keith was a wonderfully 
funny guy.   
There was a palpable excitement in the air 
on the night of the lecture.  Students and a spectrum 
of people from the community filled one of our 
auditoriums to capacity, eager to learn about the 
ethical limits of joking from two sagacious masters.  
Gimbel opened with a standup routine meant to 
offer food for thought—and, I must say, he killed.  
Almost everyone laughed and enjoyed the entire 
“lecture” (it ended up mostly consisting of Steve and 
Richard telling jokes) until the hard questions about 
racist, sexist, and religiously insensitive jokes came 
up.  One should note that the crowd was very 
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diverse; there were as many Black and Latino 
attendees as White.  Richard, undaunted by the 
stigmas around those subjects, gave a rousing 
oration on disempowering hate speech by losing our 
fear of using racially insensitive words.  He showed 
that he wasn’t afraid by chanting the ‘n-word’ to the 
crowd, who looked on with expressions that were 
equal parts horror, amusement, and fury.  It was a 
little like watching a 90-year-old white man dropping 
N-Bombs in public.  Actually, it was exactly like 
watching that.  The audience began to thin, but 
Richard was undeterred. “N-word,” “N-word,” “N-
word,” he continued.  Notice that I’m not nearly as 
courageous as Richard because I can’t even bring 
myself to write the n-word. 
The confused audience began leaving in 
droves and I started to fear for my job.  Richard 
continued.  The tension mounted.  Soon, groups of 
angry students stormed the stage, crying out for 
Richard’s head. Gimbel and I were forced to defend 
him, fending off the mobs by threatening to drop 
stage lights on them and beating them with 
microphone stands.  Richard was so courageous that 
he did not stop the lecture until we were showered 
in gore.   
Some of that story is actually true.  Ask Steve or 
Richard—or any of the administrators at SPC who 
called me on the carpet.  Incredibly, my dean still 
asks me to find the Goree Lecture speakers.  And, 
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believe it or not, I’d enthusiastically, joyfully, have 
Richard come back.  Again, and again, and again. And 
again. And again.  
C’mon now!  As everyone reading this 
essay—and all the kids in the brew pubs, coffee 
shops and groceries--know, The Gay Science 
(Section…uh…) is the one of the earliest 
deployments of the eternal return of the same.  I 
wouldn’t be doing my solemn philosophical duty if I 
didn’t make a shitty joke referring to it. 
In all seriousness, Richard, I love you and am pleased 
to call you a friend and inspiration. You are an 
innovator of a new spirit of doing philosophy—a 
Zarathustra—and are the soul of the Lighthearted 
Philosophers society.  Thank you for showing us the 
way, you gay scientist. 
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The Legend of the Altweiß 
Liz Sills 
 
Once upon a time there was an Old White 
Man. He was very funny, but not in a “haha” kind of 
way. He was funny mostly in a non-threatening 
whimsical kind of way. Everywhere he went, people 
laughed merrily. He would make horrible puns and 
people would laugh. He would pause dramatically 
before saying something innocuous and people 
would laugh. He would make racist quips using 
words for Italian people that haven’t been popular 
since the 1920s and people would laugh.  
One day, on a cobblestone path that cut 
across a verdant meadow, the Old White Man came 
across an eighty-year-old girl wearing a fauxhawk 
and no innocence whatsoever. “Old White Man,” 
she asked, gazing up into his cataract-clouded eyes, 
“Why does everyone laugh merrily in your presence 
no matter what you do? When I say the same things 
people get offended or start mansplaining the world 
to me.”  
The Old White Man thought and thought. 
He was very perplexed at the question, and also 
because the little girl had been talking to him for 
more than thirty seconds and had not laughed 
merrily. He must have an answer, he decided. 
Quickly (as quickly as he could, anyway) he made his 
way to the nearest university library and found an 
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august tome written by a venerated scholar with a 
repetitive name and decorated with an etching of a 
lemur whose sage eyes held the promise of resolving 
his quandary.  
Ravenously the Old White Man searched for 
explanations. He read that some people laugh 
merrily because they feel superior to other people or 
ideas. This could not be true, he decided, because if 
it were then people would laugh more merrily at the 
little girl and her radical haircut than they did at him. 
The tome then informed him that people laugh 
merrily when they resolve incongruities. This was 
also not true, he decided, because Old White Men 
always automatically make sense. Relief Theory? 
Although he did understand that some people might 
be intimidated by his vast knowledge of How the 
World Works, he did not think that anything about 
him would relieve anyone of that impression. Humor 
and the aesthetic? Well, he wasn’t bad to look at, he 
had to admit, but he didn’t think his visage was 
guffaw-worthy.  
Again as quickly as he could the Old White 
Man returned to the verdant meadow and found the 
little girl standing, arms crossed and legs akimbo, in 
the middle of the cobblestone path.  
“Little girl,” croaked the Old White Man, “I am funny 
simply because I am funny. There is no need for 
inquiry into the matter. I am, in a manner of 
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speaking, always funny because that’s always just 
the way it is.”  
The little girl scowled and the Old White 
Man was suddenly very disturbed that there should 
be a little girl in the world who was not smiling. He 
tried making faces, but she did not laugh merrily. 
Nor did she laugh merrily when he rubbed her 
affectionately on the head and made the most 
obvious puns he could think of. He even attempted a 
winning anecdote featuring Christian religious 
figures, overbearing wives, and a convenience store 
clerk with an Indian accent, but the little girl simply 
glared at him. 
Finally, in exasperation, the Old White Man 
demanded of the little girl: “Why are you so curious 
about the things I do, anyway? Why don’t you toddle 
off to pick daisies and poppies in the verdant 
meadow. Anyway, I’ll bet that if you wanted to try to 
be funny you could just talk about, you know, 
woman things. Like boobs. Boobs are hilarious.”  
The little girl contemplated the Old White 
Man seriously for a few moments. Finally, she 
exclaimed: “Because you’re in my way!”  
And with that, the little girl kicked the Old 
White Man in the kneecap and trotted around him 
down the cobblestone path out of verdant meadow. 
In the nearest village the simple peasant folk felt the 
tranquil rustle of a pastoral breeze and for no 
apparent reason found themselves laughing merrily.  
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A Philosopher with a Sense of Humor 
Eugene Zaldivar 
 
In this very short acknowledgment I think 
I’d like to accomplish two things. First, I’d like to give 
a sense of the affect that having seen Richard in 
action has had on me. Second, I’d like to point to an 
important development in philosophy of humor 
contributed by Richards in his work “A Philosopher 
Looks at the Sense of Humor” which I believe needs 
to be central to the philosophical discussion of 
humor and joking going forward.  
To begin with Richard C. Richards, a name 
so great it earns the full allotment of its letters, is, I 
think, an example of what we should all aspire to as 
philosophers. I believe that we are all aware of the 
many noxious tropes in our field. For one there 
seems to be a sense that there must be an element 
of suffering in any graduate program that is worth a 
damn. That, in order to earn a PhD, you must be torn 
down and shredded. I never had the privilege of 
studying with Richard, but I cannot help but believe 
that he would have nothing to do with this way of 
doing things.  
There is a second stereotype very common 
in analytic philosophy: the philosopher who believes 
that the only worthwhile response to a talk is to 
make the speaker regret having said anything at all. 
The philosopher who believes that a barely civil take-
96 
 
down which displays the commenter’s genius, for 
the mere pittance of humiliating the speaker, is the 
raison d’etra of attending a conference. That toxic, 
hostility is too often displayed at conferences and 
even putatively friendly department colloquia. I have 
never seen it in Richard. Indeed, I have seen the 
opposite.  
Richard invariably has kind things to say 
every time he offers any sort of comment. He is the 
epitome of the sort of philosopher we should all 
strive to be. He endeavors to support and enable his 
interlocutors. He is not interested in showing off 
how smart he is, but rather in helping everyone get a 
better sense of the idea being discussed. Of course, 
this does nothing to obscure just how smart he is. 
Even when he is indeed pointing to a significant 
problem, he understands that you don’t have to 
demean a person’s efforts when offering a critique.  
It took me many years of attending LPS 
conferences alongside Richard (and the rest of the 
regulars) to see that this is a better way to do things. 
To see that philosophers can contribute to a field 
without indulging our destructive tendencies. I am 
grateful to him, and the LPS, for that lesson. I hope 
to live up to it.  
I have had the privilege to comment on 
Richard’s work twice during our time at LPS. I was 
also allowed to work as his oracle; I read Richard’s 
comments on Steve Gimbel’s book at the 11th 
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meeting of the LPS in 2017. That was the smartest 
I’ve ever sounded.  
In working with Richard over the years it’s 
hard to miss one of his central concerns: getting 
clear about just what the sense of humor is and what 
it is not. Humor as he has argued at different times is 
distinct from joking, laughter and cleverness. It is 
both an attitude and an intellectual exercise. It 
makes our liver better and it helps us to understand 
our world. More precisely, he defines it as the 
playful appreciation of incongruity. It seems to me 
that this is a good analysis. His arguments have won 
me over.  
In a recent conference I suggested, half-
jokingly, that we ought to have comedy appreciation 
courses just as we have courses in film, art and 
music appreciation. I am moved, more and more to 
take this as a serious goal. If we do develop these 
courses the curriculum will be incomplete without 
Richards.  
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Putting the ‘Fun’ Back in ‘Funeral’ 
Tom Brommage 
 
 The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius writes 
in his notebooks: “You are a little soul carrying a 
corpse,” quoting the Greek stoic philosopher 
Epictetus.  As he was likely writing these notes to 
himself as a form of mental discipline in the throes of 
a military campaign, he obviously meant that 
observation to be comforting.  To most it is far from 
that, of course—but the reason why this is so is 
worthy of some attention. 
 For Marcus, the reality of death was 
manifest on the battlefield.  The purpose of this stoic 
sense of detachment from events which we can’t 
control becomes apparent in times like these: to 
remove the anxiety associated with one’s own 
unavoidable demise.  But to many in contemporary 
American society—filling their emptiness with 
consumer commodities and HOA regulations—they 
don’t like being reminded of death.  That sense of 
morbidity—or (as I will suggest, a sense of honesty 
about death) is poor manners.  The sense of ‘fleeing’ 
from death into the overwhelming variety of ‘pre-
fab’  identities is a banality amongst the existentialist 
philosophers.  But regardless: both perspectives 
occupy on an opposite place in distinction between 
what I might call a ‘common-sense attitude’ and a 
‘philosophical attitude’ towards death. 
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 By the ‘philosophical attitude,’ I mean 
nothing more than: being unafraid to think about 
uncomfortable topics.  We can sum it up under 
William James’ reflection on philosophy, that it “sees 
the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as 
if it were familiar.”  Reflections on death—
characteristic of a sense of depression and anxiety—
is one of the more uncomfortable and strange 
realities there is (those being capable of reflecting on 
it never having experienced it, of course—); the 
purpose of the philosophical attitude therefore is to 
make it familiar.  As Plato tells us in The Phaedo, 
philosophers are always preparing for death. 
 Of course: there are other types of outlooks 
towards death.  A ‘scientific outlook,’ for example—
understanding it as a cessation of metabolic 
processes—does have the same tendency to nullify 
the anxiety regarding the 'end of the tour.'  Through 
this lens, by reductionist fantasy, we can safely dodge 
the reality by obfuscating it in polysyllabic jargon.  
The scientific attitude towards death, while it fills the 
same role as the philosophical attitude, has the side 
effect of reducing death to the ontic and not the 
ontological, as Heidegger puts it.  Death is more than 
one’s corporeal existence as a corpse—it’s always 
“one’s own.” 
 The first time I met Richard about a decade 
ago, he was wearing a T-Shirt for his own funeral.  
“Putting the ‘fun’ back in funeral” it said, 
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emblazoned across the front. You see: several years 
prior Richard had held his own funeral.  When 
queried on the oddity, he responded dryly: “Well, 
one never gets to enjoy it . . .”  The simple truth of 
that reason was unavoidable.   
 This is often the first story I tell people 
about him, for two reasons.  First, I just think it’s 
cool.  One’s mind immediately turns to Twain’s Tom 
Sawyer, hiding in the church rafters, listening to the 
wails of those below at his own funeral.  But unlike 
Sawyer, Richard’s intent was not cloaked in deceitful 
or malicious intent.  It was rooted in a more 
fundamental honesty about one’s demise.   
 But secondly, I also tell this story because I 
think it captures something important about having 
a sense of humor about death.  While there are 
perhaps many different perspectives towards death 
that one might hold which might be called 
‘philosophical’ in the sense I mean above—humor is 
one of those genuinely philosophical attitudes 
towards it.  Dark and morbid humor has the effect of 
'taming' the inevitable.  And it is for this reason that 
it is truly needed: to knock one out of the malaise of 
denial.  It allows us to be honest about our own 
finitude, instead of denying its looming, icy grip.   
 For this reason, I totally intend to rip off 
that joke and hold my own funeral.  But I'm 
admitting it, because I follow Richard's example with 
his honesty, if not his creativity. 
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Objectively Funny Jokes: 
Comedy’s El Dorado or a Simple MacGuffin? 
Mike Cundall 
 
Could there ever be an objectively funny 
joke or bit of humor? With the popularity of certain 
forms of humor, with the appearance of puns as 
consistent stages in the development of humor in 
children, this seems a reasonable query. Further, 
give recent developments in humor theory, and 
depending on what stance you take on what is 
essential to the funny or humorous your answer 
could be yes or no.  
Historically, given the prevailing theories of humor 
to date, the answer would have been a resounding 
‘no’. Whether you were a Hobbesian leviathan 
superior to all, or a Freudian fellow with your mental 
plumbing bound up like your mother’s panties 
(apologies for mixing my metaphors), or a callous 
incongruitest, the answer has to be nopety-nope. 
The unifying thread through these disparate 
theories, and others in the incongruity family, of 
which our esteemed Richard C. Richards is an elder 
statesman, who certainly won’t find this essay a 
worthy honor, is that humor is a consumer-sided 
event—a demand side theory. Humor is in the mind 
of the experiencer. If it turns out that arrangement 
of elements on the side of a building looked like a 
funny face, then it was funny. The very fact that 
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there is a needed cognitive appreciation by the 
receiver of the joke in order for humor to occur, 
settles the case. To imagine a universal joke that 
would elicit mirth from an individual is to tilt at 
windmills. It’s, in the immortal words of Vizzini, 
“inconceivable.” What one might find incongruous, 
or illustrative of superiority, or redirects my mental 
or neural plumbing to release laughter and humor, is 
specific to the individual. Cultures, individual 
histories are all too vast, too varied, dare I say, to 
incongruous, to expect that there be a joke pulled 
from the bowels of the comedy club that bestows 
upon the teller, like Excalibur to Artie, a guaranteed 
laugh.  
But there are new players on the field and 
we shan’t be bound to the mistaken theories of our 
forebears no matter how august the thinker (looking 
at you, Richards). So, let us give heed to a new brand 
of humor theory—a demand side approach. An 
approach that favors the would be joke creator, as 
opposed to the plebian audience. One, if accurate, 
would offer up an answer to our leading question in 
the positive. One that would not only tilt at the 
windmills, but actually knock ‘em down. One that 
finds the fountain of youth, and lays claim to the 
comic grail of the universally funny joke: an answer 
that would pierce the incongruous heart of darkness 
and bring forth the heart of gold. And what upstart 
could propose such a radical turning of the humor 
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theories on their respective ears? Why none other 
than our own Steven Gimbel. A man whose august 
status is rivaled only by the length of his hair.  
Exorbitant as Gimbel’s recent book, Isn’t 
that Clever? is, (he does claim to find El Dorado, so 
maybe it’s worth the gold) is a healthy and needed 
look at humor theorizing that incorporates 
philosophy of science (Hempel is grinning right now, 
though the irony is lost on Popper) and a careful 
attention to those who craft jokes (Gimbel is a 
studied and practiced comedian). Gimbel’s novel 
addition to humor theory is his focus on a 
shortcoming in the dominant theory of humor, the 
incongruity theory and his alternate theory of 
humor. Gimbel explores the worry that incongruity 
becomes a vacuous term or one that is drawn out so 
broadly as to be trivially true. It is what it is after all. 
Gimbel then presents an alternative theory that 
wants to focus not on the perception of humor, but 
on the object of humor itself. Instead of relying on 
some audience dullard to note the incongruity 
presented to them, Gimbel argues that humor is “An 
act is humorous if and only if it is an intentional, 
conspicuous act of playful cleverness.” (Gimbel, 
2017) This theory is of great relief to all failed comics 
out there (perhaps Gimbel is sublimating his rage?). 
For me, I now realize that I am damn humorous and 
my wife and all those students who heretofore have 
not “gotten” my jokes in class, well phooey on them.  
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Much of the power and support to be found 
for Gimbel’s approach comes from the attention he 
pays to how people discuss humor. He cleverly notes 
that many people recognize humor as such even 
when they do not find the humor on offer mirthful. 
To Gimbel’s mind, and rightly so it seems, this is a 
tacit recognition that while one didn’t find it funny, it 
still is humor, and hence humor is not simply a 
demand side event. To recognize something as 
humor, but a failed attempt, already shows that 
humor is not simply reliant on a chortle or guffaw to 
be real humor. And while laughs may pay the bills, 
humor is more indigent, or perhaps indignant. 
Apparently, I have been making jokes for a very long 
time. 
It’s worth exploring more what Gimbel 
notes about our language when we discuss humor. 
In the semi-rhetorical query “You’re joking right!?” 
one sees a glimmer of what humor really is. Gimbel 
notes that either way one answers supports his view 
that humor is a supply side phenomenon. If you 
respond in the negative, then it isn’t a joke, my mirth 
or laugh were it present is inappropriately placed. If I 
answer in the affirmative, then the laughter is 
proper. Were it the case that humor was truly 
subjective, then the answer given by the 
interrogated wouldn’t matter. My laughter or lack 
thereof would be proper only insofar as I found it 
funny or not. Come to think of it, this would make 
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current White House press briefings a whole lot 
easier. But to return to Gimbel’s point, the fact that 
it is perfectly sensible to discuss and assign a proper 
or improper response based on whether the 
utterance was taken as a joke or not, indicates that 
there is a whole lot more than simple subjectivity in 
humor. Humor is more than the cognitive 
achievement of the perceiver. There is an important 
and totally ignored part of the attempt at humor. A 
thing agreed upon, but sometimes failed to achieve. 
Kudos to Gimbel for this work.   
Now we’re running short of time and space 
for a Feschriften sort of article; well at least an LPS 
Feschriften. But, if as Gimbel notes, the study of 
humor is really now working as a mature science and 
is really into the puzzle solving phase, what we have 
here is a genuine puzzle. Humor is either a supply 
side, objective sort of phenomenon, or it’s a demand 
side, subjective phenomenon? I think there is some 
philosophical legerdemain in the way that Gimbel 
casts incongruity theorists as subjectivists, though I 
cannot for the moment clearly define why. But the 
truth is, his points about the recognition of failed 
humor are strong, which strongly indicates that 
there is something of great importance in the 
attempt to be funny.  
What I will suggest, in a hand-waivy, I-can’t-
be-held-responsible-for-clearly-saying-why-at-the-
moment sort of way, is that our discussions of 
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humor may be enriched if we approach humor as a 
success term. The best possible exemplar, 
paradigmatic humor if you will (damn you Tom 
Kuhn), would be a case where someone intends to 
be funny, using cleverness, and that the audience 
does indeed find the act to be humorous. If we set 
this as the best of all possible humor, then we can 
preserve elements of the incongruity theory worth 
preserving, as well an bring aboard Gimbel’s insight. 
The upshot of this is that this approach is supported 
by some of what is taken as a good characteristic of 
scientific theorizing, broad range. A theory that 
brings under one tent the supply side and the 
demand side covers more of the phenomena of 
humor. And this is a step in the right direction. Our 
honoree would surely applaud the maintenance of 
the need for incongruity, and our man responsible 
for the honors will be pleased. It also has the benefit 
of widening the scope of our research and 
maintaining some of our intuitions on what humor 
is. And if science has ever liked anything, it certainly 
has to be explanations that cover more. Am I right? 
 
